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ABSTRACT
Supercomputers have played an essential role in the progress of science and
engineering research. As the high-performance computing (HPC) community
moves towards the next generation of HPC computing, it faces several chal-
lenges, one of which is reliability of HPC systems. Error rates are expected
to significantly increase on exascale systems to the point where traditional
application-level checkpointing may no longer be a viable fault tolerance
mechanism. This poses serious ramifications for a system’s ability to guar-
antee reliability and availability of its resources. It is becoming increasingly
important to understand fault-to-failure propagation and to identify key ar-
eas of instrumentation in HPC systems for avoidance, detection, diagnosis,
mitigation, and recovery of faults.
This thesis presents a software-implemented, prototype-based fault injec-
tion tool called HPCArrow and a fault injection methodology as a means to
investigate and evaluate HPC application and system resiliency. We demon-
strate HPCArrow’s capabilities through four fault injection campaigns on
a Cray XE/XK hybrid testbed, covering single injections, time-varying or
delayed injections, and injections during recovery. These injections emulate
failures on network and compute components. The results of these campaigns
provide insight into application-level and system-level resiliencies. Across
various HPC application frameworks, there are notable deficiencies in fault
tolerance. Our experiments also revealed a failure phenomenon that was pre-
viously unobserved in field data: application hangs, in which forward progress
is not made, but jobs are not terminated until the maximum allowed time
has elapsed. At the system level, failover procedures prove highly robust
on small-scale systems, able to handle both single and multiple faults in the
network.
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High-performance computing (HPC) has played an essential role in the progress
of many scientific and engineering fields that require massive amounts of
computations. These areas cover a wide spectrum from quantum physics to
molecular dynamics, brain modeling and simulations, weather and climate
research, and security. The machines used for these large amounts of compu-
tational work are large-scale, HPC systems, more commonly known as super-
computers. Current HPC systems are capable of petascale computing perfor-
mance, meaning they are able to perform one or more petaflops.1 However,
there remain many scientific problems that require computational resources
beyond what HPC systems currently offer. The United States Department
of Energy and other agencies across the world have begun conducting de-
velopment of the next generation of supercomputers, called extreme-scale or
exascale computing systems [1].
However, as the moonshot of the HPC community, exascale computing
faces several challenges. One challenge is reliability of HPC systems and
their tolerance against inevitable faults. It is expected that exascale systems
will incur excessively higher error rates [1], which has serious ramifications
for a system’s ability to guarantee reliability and availability of its resources.
Too many failures may hinder progress of computations or affect accuracy of
results because mean time between failures (MTBF) will decrease to the point
where traditional application-level checkpointing may no longer be a viable
fault tolerance mechanism. An increasing number of component failures may
also lead to other more complex scenarios of system failures. Thus it becomes
increasingly important for HPC vendors and facilities to understand fault-to-
1One petaflop is defined as one quadrillion floating point operations per second (flops).
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failure scenarios and to identify key areas of instrumentation for avoidance,
detection, diagnosis, mitigation, and recovery of faults. It may no longer be
enough to solely analyze field data from live production systems. Several
months of field data may not fully capture all known or unknown failure
scenarios. This reliability challenge underscores a critical need for other
effective techniques to investigate and evaluate HPC system resiliency. One
such technique is fault injection.
This thesis presents a software-implemented, prototype-based fault injec-
tion tool called HPCArrow2 and a fault injection methodology as a means
to evaluate HPC system resiliency and to provide insight toward improv-
ing HPC fault tolerance. We target network and compute components as
our fault models. We demonstrate HPCArrow’s capabilities through four
fault injection campaigns executed on the Blue Waters3 small-scale 96-node
Cray XE/XK hybrid testbed system, covering single injections, time-varying
or delayed injections, and both single and multiple injections during recov-
ery. The results of these campaigns provide insight into application-level and
system-level resiliencies.
1.2 Fault Injection
Fault injection is a technique widely employed to study system resiliency and
reliability through deliberate and methodical introduction of faults into the
system. This method offers a couple advantages. (1) It provides control over
fault conditions, such as timing, location, system state, etc., and (2) it can
be automated to perform experiments in a repeated, reproducible manner.
Having such control and automation allows system designers to validate error
handling and fault-tolerant mechanisms, determine coverage of error detec-
tion and recovery mechanisms, reproduce failure scenarios observed in field
data, trace the fault-to-failure propagation paths, and identify reliability vul-
nerabilities and deficiencies [2]. Insight gleaned from fault injections can then
2HPCArrow was developed by Lavin Devnani and Sharon Tang (author). HPCArrow is
based on past work by Fei Deng and is part of the Holistic, Measurement-Driven Resilience
(HMDR) project, a collaboration between the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
(UIUC); Sandia (SNL), Los Alamos (LANL), and Lawrence Berkeley (LBNL) National
Laboratories; and Cray Inc.
3Blue Waters is a petascale 26868-node Cray XE/XK hybrid system at the National
Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) located in Urbana, Illinois.
2
be utilized to identify optimal places where the system can be instrumented
for detection of faults and mitigation of their effects.
Fault injection techniques can be hardware-based or software-based [2].
Hardware-based injections typically require specialized and expensive hard-
ware support. On the other hand, software-implemented fault injection
(SWIFI) techniques offer a degree of control in terms of injection location and
time and are less expensive to deploy. Additionally, on HPC systems, most
hardware functionality is visible through software, allowing software-based
fault injection techniques to emulate faults at various levels of the system,
including hardware. These advantages are the reasons for building a SWIFI-
based HPC fault injection tool in this work, allowing faults at the hardware
and network levels to be emulated.
1.3 Related Work
There has always been a need for understanding failure scenarios and the
ramifications of errors on HPC systems. Much of this understanding has
come from measurement-based analysis of field data collected from live pro-
duction systems. In [3], over 5 million HPC application runs on Blue Waters
were analyzed to understand the impact of system errors and failures on
applications and assess application fault tolerance. In [4], data and manual
reports from Blue Waters were used to investigate and characterize single-
node failures, system-level failovers, and system-wide outages. The resiliency
of the Gemini interconnect against faults, errors, and congestion and the im-
pact of recovery procedures were assessed using Blue Waters data in [5] and
[6] and using Titan4 data in [7].
However, all of these studies, utilizing field data, are thus constrained
to naturally occurring and known failure events. Basing understanding of
fault-to-failure paths solely on production data is limiting, especially when
multiple errors and failures occur simultaneously. Information about fault
locations, health of the system, and workload conditions can be incomplete
in field data, whereas our fault injection method can provide control over
the fault conditions and environment to bring clarity to the full fault-to-
4Titan is a petascale 18688-node Cray XK system at Oak Ridge National Laboratory
located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
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failure paths. Furthermore, this production data must be collected over a
long period of time because specific instances of errors and failures may
occur infrequently. For example, Titan data was collected over the course
of one year to examine Gemini resiliency [7]. Fault injection can repeatedly
recreate the fault conditions and produce multiple instances of the same
failure scenario. Additionally, production data of petascale systems may not
fully reflect the conditions and scenarios that will arise on exascale systems.
Fault injection is useful not only for recreating failure scenarios observed in
production data, but also for simulating new scenarios that may not have
been encountered so far in current systems.
Other studies of HPC systems have analyzed resiliency behaviors through
methods such as stress testing. A microbenchmark application was developed
in [8] to stress the network and uncover performance problems on Titan’s
Gemini interconnect. In [9], standard benchmarks and scientific applications
were utilized to understand application performance and runtime consistency.
Our fault injector incorporates a similar idea in running a set of benchmarks
and scientific applications to emulate a workload environment that is similar
to real workloads on production systems. This use of real applications also
provides a perspective on the fault tolerance of HPC application framework
and helps to uncover any resiliency vulnerabilities.
Previous works have also featured software-based fault injection studies on
HPC systems, but these faults model low-level errors and target HPC appli-
cations. In [10], a hierarchical injection methodology is adopted, focusing on
assembly-level and register transfer level (RTL) or gate-level faults injected
into HPC applications. FlipIt is a LLVM-based compiler-level fault injection
tool, focused on memory bit-flip errors that target HPC applications [11].
It is tested on Blue Waters [11]. F-SEFI is a fault injector that focuses on
injection of soft errors targeting instructions of HPC applications and their
subroutines [12]. F-SEFI is tested on the QEMU virtual machine (VM) and
its hypervisor [12]. A machine learning framework is used in [13] to diag-
nose node-level anomalies while programs were used to stress a single node
of a multi-node HPC application. These injections were performed on VMs
as well as a Cray XC testbed. FINJ presented in [14] is a high-level fault
injection tool for HPC systems that targets a node via tasks, which can be a
benchmark or a fault-triggering program. This design allows FINJ to be inte-
grated with any low-level fault injection framework that can be triggered by
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an executable program or a shell script [14]. FINJ is tested on a single-node
prototype system [14].
From among these HPC fault injection studies, there is a noticeable lack
of fault injections at the network level. Our fault injector, on the other hand,
not only generates faults at the node level, but also targets components at the
network level. While we do not look at fine-grained node-level aspects such as
memory congestion, our tool can be extended to include these programs de-
signed to stress node resources or to target application instructions. We also
evaluate application-level fault tolerance, using multiple HPC benchmarks
or applications, and we assess resiliency at the network and system levels by
analyzing network traffic data, system logs, and recovery behaviors. These
other fault injection studies also do not all inject on full production HPC sys-
tems; some inject on prototype systems or VMs. The injection experiments
presented in this thesis are all executed on a small-scale Cray XE/XK hybrid
testbed, similar to the one in [13]. Details of the experiment environment
are discussed later.
The work and results presented in this thesis are based on previous fault
injection experiments performed on a much larger 8944-node system called
Cielo.5 Those experiments were able to produce critical system failures due
to faults at the network level [15]. The work presented in this thesis extends
Cielo’s fault injection experiments to Blue Waters with the aim to recreate
similar failure scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, this work combined
with the work performed on Cielo is the largest fault injection study con-
ducted on HPC systems.
1.4 Contributions
The main goal of this research study is to evaluate the resiliency of HPC
systems in the presence of faults and to improve understanding of fault-to-
failure propagation and failure impact on the performances and behaviors of
HPC applications and systems. To that end, the key contributions of this
thesis include:
• Fault injection toolkit HPCArrow for large-scale HPC sys-
5Cielo was the (now retired) Cray XE petascale system developed jointly by LANL and
SNL under the Advanced Computing at Extreme Scale (ACES) partnership.
5
tems. We developed a fault injector that is system-independent, as
long as Python, a scripting language, is supported and as long as loca-
tions targeted for fault injection are accessible to software. HPCArrow
provides a controlled environment to inject one or more faults into
the system by executing system-specific commands. These commands
mimic failures of network and compute components: network links,
directional connections, compute nodes, and compute blades. HPCAr-
row also provides the ability to conduct fault injection experiments in
a repeatable, reproducible manner by being able to control timing and
location of faults. The injector is also able to restore failed compo-
nents back into service and return the system to a fault-free state. In
addition to simply injecting faults at user-specified times and locations,
HPCArrow can monitor network events in real time and conduct mul-
tiple injections during an automatic recovery process initiated by an
earlier fault injection. Injections are targeted at a user-specified recov-
ery stage. This injector is successfully used to perform four different
types of fault injection campaigns on a Cray XE/XK hybrid testbed
with a Gemini interconnect and can successfully provide insight into
fault-to-failure paths. It has also been verified to work on several Cray
XC systems that use the Aries interconnect, and fault injection exper-
iments are currently underway with SNL.
• A set of HPC applications configured and compiled to study
their susceptibility to network-level faults. A total of nine unique
applications, spanning three HPC application frameworks, were com-
piled and configured to run as real workloads on the system. These
frameworks include Charm++, Message Passing Interface (MPI), and
Partitioned Global Address Space (PGAS), all of which offer a wide
range of fault tolerance and other communication features. From the
results of the fault injection campaigns, we observed a variety of ap-
plication behaviors such as crashes, hangs, and no impact. We also
observed that certain frameworks are more susceptible to network-level
faults than others with Charm++ being the most susceptible and MPI
being the least.
• A set of fault injection experiments to demonstrate the sys-
tem and application behaviors in the presence of faults. Across
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almost 300 fault injection experiments, we observed application crashes
and hangs caused by a simple failure of the network, despite success-
ful failover recovery procedures. These simple failures include a single
link fault or a single connection (multiple links) fault. Originally, we
expected all applications would be able to tolerate link and connection
faults due to there being other pathways to take once failover recov-
ery recomputes and installs new routes. Unexpectedly, however, many
applications were not fault tolerant against even these simple failures.
• Identification of an application failure behavior previously un-
seen in field data. Hung applications was one application-level be-
havior observed as response to network-level faults. This kind of behav-
ior due to simple faults had not been observed before in field data, but
our fault injector and methodology uncovered this somewhat alarming
phenomenon. Hung applications are a waste of system resources and
detract from availability and performance. Network and system logs
are insufficient to differentiate between application crashes and hangs.
Application logs and job scheduler information are the only indicators
of an application hang, but this can only be diagnosed and determined
after the fact. Real-time detection and handling of such behavior should
become a priority in future work.
• Understanding and assessment of HPC systems failover re-
sponses to network-level faults. Through HPCArrow, we are able
to inject single or multiple faults during an ongoing recovery proce-
dure triggered by a previous fault. This is achieved through real-time
monitoring of network events communicated in constantly updated and
rotated network logs. This allowed us to conduct a fault injection cam-
paign to observe and assess the failover mechanisms that respond to
failures in the network. These experiments showed a deeply robust
failover procedure that can handle all faults injected in our experi-
ments. Since we could not reproduce the deadlocks and system-wide
outages caused by fault injections on Cielo, we suspect that the win-
dow of recovery on our small-scale testbed is too short to allow any
propagation of faults throughout the network and system. Failovers
may also have a window of vulnerability that is either nonexistent or
too short to be targeted by faults on small-scale systems. However,
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we do observe that simple network failures during recovery yield longer
recovery durations. Faults during failover cause the recovery process
either to automatically restart or to start a second recovery instance,
which in turn causes the recovery time to increase. An increased time
in failover recovery means an increase in the probability of the occur-
rence of additional failures, which may lead to catastrophic failures in
the system [5].
• Foundational work for a comparison study on two network
fabrics and their resiliency behaviors in the presence of faults.
The Aries Dragonfly interconnect is a more modern network fabric than
the Gemini interconnect. However, Aries still shares similar resiliency
mechanisms with Gemini. The work and results in this study have
laid the foundation for this next step of comparison between Aries and
Gemini. HPCArrow has already been extended to work on Cray XC
systems utilizing the Aries interconnect. Applications have also been
selected, compiled, and configured to run on Cray XC systems. Despite
some architectural and network differences, the same fault injection
methodology used in this study on Gemini also works on Aries.
1.5 Challenges
Throughout the course of this study, we encountered many very involved chal-
lenges that required mostly trial-and-error type approaches to solve. These
include:
• Compiling and configuring HPC applications to be scaled down
and to run for a desirable amount of time. While this work in-
volved nine unique applications, there is a much longer list of appli-
cations that we tried and failed to get running on the Cray XE/XK
testbed. This testbed is a small-scale system of 96 nodes,6 which is
much smaller than a large-scale production system like Blue Waters.
We suspect that many scientific applications are inherently too large
to run on small-scale systems. The applications we did manage to get
6For this research, we were limited to 64 nodes (top two chassis) on this one-cabinet
system as requested by NCSA.
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working still required a great deal of configuration time to scale to
our various workload needs and to adjust to our experiment runtime
needs. Adjusting parameters is very difficult across nine applications
because some level of understanding of each application is necessary.
Because each HPC system may be outfitted with different software
versions and hardware components, porting applications from one sys-
tem to another is also nontrivial as it requires re-compilation and re-
configuration. This step of the experiment setup process is the most
time consuming. We are grateful for the help and insights of NCSA
application specialists on a couple of these applications.
• Limitations of development and of running statistically sig-
nificant number of experiments. Due to the need to have con-
trollable environments and repeatable experiments, the injector was
also equipped with the ability to restore the system back to a fault-
free state. This restoration is the warm swap process, which can take
up to 10 minutes, depending on the injected component. Given that
the fault injection occurs around five minutes into an application’s run
time, we decide to limit an experiment’s run time to be around 30
minutes. However, since all applications and their parameters cannot
be precisely adjusted in the same manner, some applications may take
around 40 minutes. In this work, an experiment can be as short as 33
minutes. If an experiment produces a hung application, that applica-
tion will not terminate until it hits the maximum amount of time, set
by us to be two hours. This amount of time severely limits the number
of experiments we can run. Additionally, two thirds of the testbed (top
two chassis) was reserved for us on certain days of the week for a time
period between 7pm and 7am as this was when other users were un-
likely to use the testbed. Our access to the SMW was further limited
due to requiring supervised root access, which extends our development
and test cycle significantly.
• Collecting the logs needed for analysis (network data, system
logs, application logs, injection logs, experiment logs). All the
logs necessary for analysis are scattered all over the system. Application
logs are stored on a user’s local account; network data is protected
behind privilege levels; and both system logs and injector logs sit on
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the SMW, which requires root access. We developed a log collector
module in HPCArrow. Since our injector sits on the SMW, running in
the background, it is designed to collect all logs and transfer them to
our user accounts and modify privileges on a daily basis. This module
significantly cut our experiment and analysis time as we no longer had
to make daily trips to NCSA or wait on a system administrator to
package and send the logs to us.
• Small window of recovery that limits injections during recov-
ery. Because our Cray XE/XK testbed is a small-scale system, its
failover recovery duration is very short. Most recovery stages are less
than three seconds and there are delays due to recovery stage detection
and time to fault injection. This means that not all recovery stages
are good candidates to target for injection. Certain optimizations were
made to HPCArrow to remove as much unnecessary overhead as pos-
sible, which ensured that recovery stages lasting about two seconds or
more are still eligible targets for certain fault types.
1.6 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we provide
background information on the architecture and system software of Cray
XE/XK systems with specific focus on Blue Waters, the Gemini interconnect,
and the system’s fault tolerance mechanisms. In Chapter 3, we introduce and
detail our fault injection methodology, detailing fault models, benchmark
applications run as workloads on the system, and the fault injector toolkit
HPCArrow. In Chapter 4, we describe our experimental setup and present
our four fault injection campaigns and their results. We conclude this work





This chapter provides background information on the architecture and sys-
tem software of Cray XE/XK petascale systems, using Blue Waters as the
example. These machines are highly scalable supercomputers, able to deliver
one or more petaflops to scientific and engineering computing applications.
Blue Waters can deliver up to approximately 13.3 petaflops at peak speed
[16]. This chapter also includes background information on the fault-tolerant
features and mechanisms of Cray XE/XK systems, including fault detection
and recovery mechanisms.
This study is based on past works that have analyzed data generated by
Blue Waters [4],[6],[5] and fault injection experiments performed on Cielo [15].
This study contributes to that body of work by conducting fault injection
experiments on the Blue Waters test and development system called JYC,1
which is built and managed identically to Blue Waters. These heterogeneous
petascale systems, running on the Cray Linux Environment (CLE) oper-
ating system, combine the best of AMD’s multicore processors, NVIDIA’s
many-core graphics processing unit (GPU) accelerators, and Cray’s Gemini
interconnect.
2.1 System Architecture
A general Cray XE/XK system is organized into a hierarchy of cabinets,
chassis, blades, nodes, and links, as shown in Figure 2.1. At the highest level
are cabinets, physically arranged in rows and columns. Larger systems have
more rows. Each cabinet typically has an L1 cabinet controller, blower fan,
and power conversion electronics [5]. At the next level of granularity in the
hierarchy, each cabinet contains three chassis (also called cages). A chassis
1JYC is named for Jacques-Yves Cousteau.
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Figure 2.1: Gemini hierarchy of a typical Cray HPC system.
consists of eight blades. Each blade consists of a network mezzanine card
that houses a pair of Gemini application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC),
which act as network routers [5]. The Gemini ASICs are connected such
that each blade provides a 1x4x1 network of nodes in the overall folded 3D
torus topology [17]. Thus each Gemini ASIC is shared between two nodes.
Additionally, each blade also packages four nodes, which can be XE, XK, or
service nodes.
2.1.1 Nodes
• Services nodes are primarily used as boot nodes for system-wide re-
boots, as system database (SDB) nodes to collect event logs, as MOM
nodes for scheduling jobs, as Lustre Filesystem Network (LNET) nodes
to handle metadata and file I/O data for file system servers and clients,
or as network gateway nodes to connect external networks through In-
finiband QDR IB cards [4]. Service nodes on Blue Waters can be hosted
on Cray XIO blades or Cray XE6 blades. Each XIO Service node con-
sists of a 6-core AMD Opteron 2435 “Istanbul” with 16 gigabytes (GB)
of DDR2 memory in 4 GB DIMMs protected by x4 Chipkill [4]. In this
study, we were asked to not target service nodes.
• XE nodes are two-socket compute nodes. On Blue Waters, XE nodes
are hosted on Cray XE6 blades with four nodes per blade. On each
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(a) Cray XE6 Blade (b) Cray XK7 Blade
Figure 2.2: Cray XE6 and XK7 blade hardware.
node, both sockets are each occupied by a 16-core AMD Opteron 6276
“Interlagos” processor [16]; each Opteron holds 8 dual-core AMD Bull-
dozer modules, each of which has an 8x64 kilobyte (KB) L1 instruction
cache, a 16x16 KB L1 data cache, an 8x2 megabyte (MB) L2 cache,
and a 2x8 MB L3 cache [4]. With two 16-core Opteron 6276 proces-
sors, a node has a combined 64 GB of DDR3 RAM in 8 GB DIMMs,
protected by x8 Chipkill [4].
• XK nodes are two-socket GPU nodes. On Blue Waters, these nodes
are hosted on Cray XK7 blades with four nodes per blade. On each
node, one socket is equipped with one 16-core AMD Opteron 6272
“Interlagos” processor with 32 GB of DDR3 RAM in 8 GB DIMMs [16].
Note that an XK node has half the RAM of an XE node. The other
socket on the node contains an NVIDIA K20X “Kepler” accelerator
[16]. This GPU is the main difference between XK and XE nodes.
The accelerators house 2880 single-precision CUDA cores, 64 KB of L1
cache, 1536 KB of L2 cache, and 6 GB of DDR5 RAM memory that is
protected with ECC [4].
2.1.2 Blades
All blade types (XIO, XE6, XK7) are powered by four Cray Verty voltage
regulator modules, one for each node on the blade, and the power distribution
unit in a cabinet. Every blade also holds an L0 controller that monitors the
general health of the blades components. The two blades of interest in this
study are the XE6 and XK7, as shown in Figure 2.2a and 2.2b, respectively.
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Figure 2.3: Cray Gemini interconnect with a folded 3D torus topology.
Each cube represents a Gemini ASIC. The folded aspect is depicted by the
loops (only three are drawn).
2.2 High-Speed Network
Communication on Cray systems occurs over the high-speed network (HSN).
There are various vendor proprietary network designs such as Cray’s Gemini
and Aries or IBM’s Blue Gene [5]. The work presented in this thesis focuses
on the Cray Gemini interconnect and the Gemini ASIC, the basic building
block of Blue Waters’ HSN. The ASICs are arranged in a folded 3D torus
topology [16], as shown in Figure 2.3. This folding minimizes the maximum
cable length to connect all nodes in a single dimension [8]. The advantages of
the Gemini interconnect include high performance on MPI applications and
filesystem traffic, hardware support for global address space programming,
and efficient implementation of programming languages on massively, parallel
systems such as HPCs [17].
2.2.1 Connections
On Blue Waters the network topology is of dimension 24x24x24 (X×Y×Z)
[16]. In the X and Z directions (rows and columns of cabinets, respectively),
every other cabinet is directly connected with loopback cables at the ends for
a full torus; the Y direction loops back from the top chassis to the bottom
chassis within a cabinet, connecting blades in the same dimension [8]. As
shown in Figure 2.4, each node on a blade is connected in the Y dimension,
which is called the mezzanine, and each node across blades is connected in
the Z dimension, which is called the backplane. Note that if there are more
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Figure 2.4: A single cabinet with three chassis and eight blades per chassis.
The Y+/- and Z+/- connection directions are shown. The unlabeled X
dimension goes into and out of the page.
cabinets in the Z direction, cables will connect the nodes across blades in that
dimension. Connections in the X direction (not explicitly shown in Figure
2.4) are all cables.
As mentioned, each blade consists of a network mezzanine card that holds
two Gemini ASICs. Each of these ASICs communicates within the HSN in
six directions: X+, X-, Y+, Y-, Z+, and Z-. There are 10 torus connections:
two in each of X+, X-, Z+, and Z- directions (eight total) and one in each
Y+ and Y- directions (two total) [17].
2.2.2 Gemini ASIC Router
A Gemini ASIC consists of two network interface controllers (NICs), a net-
work link block, and a 48-port router [17]. Each NIC has its own Hyper-
Transport3 (HTC3) interface, which is used by a node to attach to the ASIC
and send its requests as packets through the HSN [17]. There is a network
link block that connects the NICs to the router and there is a supervisor
block that monitors the ASIC and connects to the L0 blade controller, which
in turn relays information to the Cray Hardware Supervisory System (HSS)
[17]. The ASIC router follows a tile-based design [17], using a 6x8 array of
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Figure 2.5: The 6x8 array of tiles: eight are ptiles (P) and the other 40 are
ntiles, labeled by the connection direction.
tiles, eight of which are called ptiles and are reserved for the NIC. The rest,
40 ntiles, are left for the network connections [8]. Figure 2.5 depicts the 48
tiles and their assignments.
2.2.3 Links
Each tile in the ASIC router provides a link. According to Figure 2.5, there
are eight links each for the X+, X-, Z+, and Z- directions and four links
each for the Y+ and Y- directions. Thus each torus connection consists of
four links. Each link is mapped and uniquely identified on the Cray system
and logs by its physical location in the tile layout. Each link is comprised
of three single-bit bi-directional lanes, which means each torus connection is
comprised of 12 lanes [17].
2.3 Hardware Supervisory System
The HSS is a hardware and software system responsible for monitoring the
health of Cray Systems, detecting errors in its hardware components and
network, and mitigating these errors and their effects. It also controls system
startup and shutdown. The HSS contains HSS managers, which oversee
various monitoring responsibilities, including boot process, component states,
system routing, and more [18]. The HSS also includes the L0 blade and L1
cabinet controllers that monitor nodes and the HSN, respond to periodic
heartbeat requests, and log health data such as blade temperatures, power
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supplies, network performance counters, and runtime software exceptions
[18]. The HSS communicates with these management controllers through
its own private network, which is separate from the HSN [18], and connects
them to the System Management Workstation (SMW).
2.4 System Management Workstation
The SMW orchestrates reliability, accessibility, and serviceability tasks, such
as recovery operations in response to failures, and it manages the HSS net-
work [18]. It is a single point of control for the HSS and provides a console
for system administrators to manage the Cray system [18]. Logs related to
the system health, such as HSS events or HSN failures, are stored on the
SMW. These logs are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The fault
injections performed in this study are triggered from the SMW.
2.5 Lustre File Systems
Lustre provides a high-performance, highly scalable parallel distributed file
system [18]. It is deployed on many HPCs, including Blue Waters, which
houses three Lustre-based file systems with a little over 26 petabytes (PB)
of combined usable storage, 34 PB of combined raw storage, and about 1.1
terabytes (TB) per second of storage bandwidth [16]. Further detail on Blue
Waters’ file system and Lustre may be found in [9].
2.6 ALPS, TORQUE, and Moab
Jobs, which are comprised of applications that a user runs on an HPC sys-
tem, are scheduled, placed, and launched by a software suite that can vary
across HPCs. On Blue Waters, this suite includes the Cray Application Level
Placement Scheduler (ALPS) and the Terascale Open-source Resource and
Queue (TORQUE) Resource Manager integrated with the Moab Workload
Manager [19].
ALPS is the mechanism for application placement, launch, and manage-
ment [18]. Applications are either submitted through batch jobs or through
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interactive sessions. ALPS also provides an Extensible Markup Language
(XML) interface in order for users to communicate batch job requirements
and components to third-party batch systems. The batch system on Blue
Waters uses a combination of TORQUE and Moab managers. TORQUE
manages the system resources by reserving them for jobs while Moab man-
ages batch job queuing or scheduling. Further detail on TORQUE, Moab,
and ALPs can be found in [20], [21], and [22], respectively.
2.7 Fault Tolerance and Resiliency
Failures in large scale systems are inevitable and expected, but applications
are still expected to survive and continue running. To account for the high
likelihood of errors, Cray systems are designed to provide several layers of
protection against errors in both hardware and software. The Gemini in-
terconnect, in particular, was designed to be fault tolerant against network
failures. This is achieved through hardware-level error checking and correc-
tions as well as through network hardware redundancy. In the inevitable
event of a failure, the system must be able to detect it, mitigate its effects,
and recover from it, ideally without requiring a full system reboot so as to
minimize system downtime. The system adds its own layers of fault tolerance
through the dimension ordered routing protocol, the HSS, and the failover
recovery and warm swap restoration procedures.
2.7.1 Hardware-Level Error Detection and Correction
Packets in the HSN are protected by a 16-bit cyclic redundancy check (CRC)
and Gemini links reinforce reliable traffic delivery via a sliding window pro-
tocol [17]. When a Gemini receives a packet, it checks the CRC and reports
if it is incorrect. Before a packet leaves a Gemini, during the transition from
router to NIC, the CRC is checked once more in order to detect any corrup-
tion from within the router itself [17], such as the routing table. If the CRC
fails, the packet is marked as bad, passed along, and then finally dropped
at the destination Gemini. Additionally, other error correcting code (ECC)
techniques, such as single error correction-double error detection (SEC-DED)
and Chipkill are used to detect and correct major errors in memory, data
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paths, and processors [4]. All such error events are reported to and logged
by the HSS.
2.7.2 Network Hardware Redundancy
Redundancy is another common and effective technique to provide a fault-
tolerant network. As discussed previously, there are several directions of torus
connections with one redundant torus connection in each of the X+, X-, Z+,
and Z- directions. Each torus connection consists of four redundant links and
each link consists of three redundant bi-directional lanes. Packets traveling
through the HSN are spread out over the links by the Gemini adaptive routing
hardware [17]. If a lane fails, the adaptive routing hardware masks it out
and load balances the traffic over the remaining two lanes in a link [17].
2.7.3 Dimension Ordered Routing
The Gemini interconnect routes traffic based on dimension ordered routing.
In a faultless HSN, the protocol is as follows in order [23]:
1. Route traffic in X+/-, Y+, or Z+ directions, until the X dimension is
resolved and it reaches the X coordinate of the destination node
2. Route traffic in Y+/- or Z+ directions, until the Y dimension is resolved
and it reaches the Y coordinate of the destination node
3. Route traffic in Z+/- directions, until it reaches the Z coordinate and
the final destination node
In an HSN with one or more faults present, the routing can no longer
be the optimal path and traffic may become unbalanced, possibly leading
to network congestion and poorer application performance. Following the
protocol, if the network is trying to resolve in the X dimension, but finds
that it is blocked in both X+ and X- directions, it will try the Y+ direction
next. If that is blocked, then it attempts the Z+ direction [23].
Based on these rules, there are failures that may cause unroutable scenar-
ios, i.e. there are holes or gaps in the HSN that cannot be routed around. For
























Figure 2.6: State transition diagram for the lane recovery procedure.
Adapted from [6].
routers in a single Z dimension loop have failed, then the network is un-
routable. When this happens, recovery procedures that involve rerouting
will fail. Thus the routing algorithm automatically performs dimension or-
der retries if route computations continue to fail [23]. It will attempt different
permutations of dimension orders (e.g. YZX or ZYX, instead of the initial
XYZ). This feature can be disabled [23].
2.7.4 Lane Recovery
The redundancy of three lanes per link provides a level of network resiliency,
allowing the Gemini interconnect to tolerate up to two lane failures. The
HSN runs in degraded mode so that if a lane fails, the network can continue
functioning through the other two lanes, albeit at a reduced HSN bandwidth
[8]. Without running in degraded mode, a single lane failure would mean an
entire link would go down [23].
When a downed lane is identified, it is handled by the L0 blade controller
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and logged in the SMW’s netwatch log [23]. In degraded mode, if all three
lanes fail, then the whole link containing the lanes is marked as inactive and
the link failover procedure, rather than lane recovery, is initiated [23]. If lane
recovery is unsuccessful, the L0 will invoke the lane recovery procedure a set
number of times (configurable parameter in a settings file) before giving up
[23]. The lane recovery procedure, as shown in Figure 2.6, attempts to bring
up all lanes on the channel; it does not target individual lanes for efficiency
[23].
While this lane bring-up procedure is a recovery mechanism supported
by the system, the ability to manually remove or take down specific lanes
in a link using system administrator commands is absent. Given this, we
currently do not have any means to trigger this automatic lane recovery in
a controlled environment. Thus we leave exploration of this fault and its
recovery mechanism out of this study.
2.7.5 Automatic Failover Recovery
When a link fails (or when all three lanes in a link go down), the L0 detects
the failure and handles it automatically by triggering the failover recovery
procedure [23]. There are many reasons a link may become unavailable,
including power loss to a Gemini mezzanine on a blade, power loss to a blade
itself, or power loss to a whole cabinet [23]. Link failures may also happen
due to faulty cables, routing table corruption, or software deadlock [6].
When the failover is triggered while the system is in an initial state with no
other failed components present, a series of recovery actions are automatically
executed as follows [23]:
1. Aggregate failures. Waits 10 seconds by default in case any more
link failures occur. If there are any more failures, the failed links will
be processed and added to a list.
2. Alive. Determines which blades are alive. If there is a failure due to
power loss to a blade, there will be no response to the alive request;
a 30-second timeout will occur instead for the powerless blade. If the
failure is due to a power loss to a cabinet, there will again be no response












































Figure 2.7: State transition diagram for the automatic failover recovery
procedure. Adapted from [6].
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removed from routing. Each failed LCB (up to 960 in a fully configured
system) is marked with an alert flag; each Gemini ASIC on each blade
in the failed cabinet is marked with an alert flag.
3. Route compute. Computes and stages new routes to the L0s.
4. Quiesce. Quiesces the network traffic (i.e. stop all network traffic
temporarily) and drains the network traffic.
5. Switch netwatch. Makes the netwatch daemon on blades use the
newly computed routes.
6. Down unused links. Takes down any links that are still active but
unused by the new routes.
7. Route install. Asserts the new routes in the Gemini ASICs.
8. Unquiesce. Allows all network traffic to resume.
9. Finish. Performs any final cleanup details to restore the system back
to its initial, fault-free state.
This automatic recovery process typically lasts for about 30 seconds. For
failure scenarios with power losses to the blade or whole cabinet, the recovery
procedure can take up to 60 seconds due the extra timeout time. On much
larger systems, this recovery process is expected to take much longer. For
example, on Cielo, which had almost 9000 nodes, one recovery took over
600 seconds [15]. Excluding recovery time, the failover processes for link,
connection, node, and blade failures are exactly the same.
Quiescing and draining the network traffic is important to avoid network
deadlocks, which may occur if there are still packets being routed while new
network routes are being installed. Usually, the failover process will avoid
disrupting and quiescing the network by instead masking any failed lanes
and operating in degraded mode. This, however, cannot be avoided in the
case of complete communication loss between two Gemini ASICs and in the
case of blade or whole cabinet failures.
Failover procedures can either succeed and restore the network paths,
which is called a successful failover. The other outcome is a failed failover,
23
which can leave the whole system in an unusable state, known as a system-
wide outage (SWO). Figure 2.7 shows a state diagram of this failover proce-
dure combined with the lane recovery procedure shown in Figure 2.6.
2.7.6 Warm Swap Restoration
The warm swap procedure is a recovery mechanism to manually add or dis-
able hardware components in a live system, without needing to restart the
system or otherwise impact other components of the system. Unlike the pre-
vious automatic recovery mechanisms discussed, this process must be manu-
ally initiated by a system administrator. In this work, we will use the word
restoration to refer to the warm swap procedure in order to differentiate from
the word recovery, which we will use to refer to the failover process.
The series of steps during a warm swap is nearly identical to that of the
failover procedure. The main difference is additional stages before the net-
work is quiesced. These new stages include clearing link alerts, testing the
rerouting, initialization of new links, and initialization of new blades (if per-
forming a blade warm swap). Every stage following network quiescence is
identical to those of the failover process. Figure 2.8 shows the state diagram
of a warm swap. This process typically takes about 60 seconds for links or
connections and 10 minutes for blades since the warm swap add command
performs a cold start on blades.
In this study, after each and every fault injection, the warm swap procedure
is invoked by the injector, which is running on the SMW. Warm swapping is
necessary to restore the component that was selected for take-down and to
return the system and HSN back to an uncongested, fault-free state.
2.8 Test and Development System
In this work, we conducted fault injection experiments on JYC, a single
cabinet Cray XE/XK hybrid testbed provided to us by NCSA. NCSA uses
JYC as a test and development system on which software and other changes
are tested and evaluated before deployment on Blue Waters. JYC shares all
the same hardware components (blades, nodes, links, Gemini ASICs, etc.),























































Figure 2.8: State transition diagram for the warm swap recovery procedure.
Adapted from [6].
(Cray Linux Environment, ALPS, TORQUE/Moab, etc.) as those of Blue
Waters. The main difference between JYC and Blue Waters is size.
2.8.1 Architecture
Since it is a one-cabinet machine, JYC is constructed from a total of 96 dual-
socket AMD Opteron nodes organized across three chassis: 56 XE nodes,
28 XK nodes, and 14 service nodes. Figure 2.9 shows the system map of
components on JYC. On this machine, 12 of the 14 service nodes are hosted
on Cray XIO blades; the other two service nodes are hosted on a Cray XE6
blade along with two XE nodes. Additionally, the 56 XE nodes are all hosted
on 14 Cray XE6 blades and the 28 XK nodes are all hosted on seven Cray
XK7 blades. As illustrated in Figure 2.9, Chassis 0 (c0), the bottom chassis,
contains XE and service nodes: three blades are entirely service nodes while
a fourth blade comprises two more service nodes. No user is allowed to
run jobs on any service node. Chassis 1 (c1), the middle chassis, consists
of all XE nodes while Chassis 2 (c2), the top chassis, primarily consists of
XK nodes (28 out of 32 total). Due to being a one-cabinet machine, JYC’s
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Gemini interconnect is also reduced by one dimension in the X+ and X-
directions as there are no other cabinets to cable to. Thus the number of
torus connections is reduced to six: one each in the Y+ and Y- directions
and two each in the Z+ and Z- directions.
2.8.2 System Mapping
These compute and network components each have a component name (cname).
Cabinets have an X and Y position in the physical machine layout. In the
case of JYC, its cabinet name is c0-0 since there it is only one cabinet. The
next level of components are chassis, which are identified by their vertical
position c[0-2] with c0 being the bottom chassis and c2 being the top. The
vertical position corresponds to the same Y dimension as in Figure 2.4. The
components that make up a chassis are blades, which are identified by their
position s[0-7] going from left (s0) to right (s7) in Figure 2.9. This is the same
as the Z dimension in Figure 2.4. There are two Gemini ASICs on each blade,
identified by their position g[0-1] with g0 as the bottom ASIC and g1 as the
top ASIC. On each blade, there are nodes, specifically four nodes per blade
or two nodes per Gemini ASIC. Nodes are identified by their position in the
Y dimension n[0-3] with n0 and n1 always connected to Gemini g0 and n2
and n3 always connected to Gemini g1. Additionally, each node is assigned a
unique decimal value, which serves as its unique node ID (nid000[0-96]) with-
out the need to specify cabinet, chassis, and blade locations. While links are
not depicted in Figure 2.9, they nevertheless have their own naming scheme
based on physical location as well: l[0-5][0-7]. This positional naming for
links comes from the ASIC router’s 6x8 tile array as shown in Figure 2.5.
This naming is explained in more detail in Figure A.1 in Appendix A.
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Figure 2.9: System map of components on JYC. Black nodes are service
nodes; blue nodes are XE nodes; orange nodes are XK nodes. Chassis are
identified as c[0-2]; blades are identified as s[0-7]; and nodes are identified
as n[0-3] (component name). Each node is additionally labeled with a




This chapter presents our fault injection methodology in assessing system re-
siliency in the presence of faults. Specifically, it details (1) the fault models
used to understand system behavior during failures (fault-to-failure scenar-
ios), (2) the benchmark applications chosen to run as workloads during fault
injection experiments, (3) the toolkit HPCArrow, designed to execute and
log the experiments, and (4) the data collected and processed for analysis
and assessment. This approach can be applied to any Cray system, only
requiring special consideration for application and execution setup because
implementation details are dependent upon each system’s configuration suite
(e.g. Python versions, compiler versions, Slurm vs. TORQUE job schedulers,
etc.).
3.1 Fault Models
We target network and compute components as our fault models. These
models involve failures in network links and connections as well as in com-
pute nodes and blades. This study considers both single faults and multiple
faults. A single-fault model involves only one fault injection during an ex-
periment, which is defined as the runtime window of a set of applications
running simultaneously on the system. A multiple-fault model involves two
or more faults. In our experiments, we inject up to two faults, with the second
fault deliberately injected during the automatic failover recovery procedure
initiated by the first fault being injected.
Production data from Blue Waters showed that the most common failures
were single/multiple node failures and link failures [4]. Over one-fourth of
the failures observed triggered automatic failovers [4]. These failures also led
to system-wide outages (SWOs) in which the whole system is unavailable
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Figure 3.1: Link fault model, targeting a single link in a torus connection of
a Gemini ASIC. Two torus connections (lighter colored and marked by
black X’s) are not used as connections for the HSN, but instead used
internally to communicate with the nodes.
(e.g. user cannot log in, cannot access all data blocks of the file system, etc.)
[4]. Close to two-thirds of the SWOs are a result of failover procedures failing
and affecting re-routing of the Gemini network or access to the Lustre file
system [4]. It was also found that network failovers are frequent and that the
majority of these triggered failovers were due to lane failures [5]. The next
most frequent cause of failovers was link failures [5]. This is also confirmed
in studies of other HPC systems, such as Titan [7]. The lane fault model,
however, is not included in this study as there is no controlled way (e.g. a
Cray administrator command) to trigger lane faults at this time. This is left
for future work. Nevertheless, improving failover procedures is important
and this study aims to provide a methodology to assess resiliency of recovery
procedures.
3.1.1 Single Injection: Link
A link fault, as shown in Figure 3.1, models the failure of a network link
that connects two Gemini ASIC routers. We recreate this failure scenario
by sending a system administrator command to mark the status of the link
component as unavailable or removed from service. In real scenarios, this
status flag is typically modified to deactivate problem links. This process
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effectively masks out any problem links and prevents further use. Traffic that
may have been using the problem link is then re-routed to use other links
on the same connection. A link failure on one Gemini ASIC also affects the
Gemini ASIC on the opposite end. The HSS is responsible for monitoring the
health of a Cray system for such failures. When the HSS detects a failure, it
feeds this information to a link failover manager on the SMW, thus triggering
the automatic failover [24].
The automated failover is expected to mask link failures without causing
any major interruption of the system. If the link failure leads to the discon-
nection of an ASIC, then the failover process needs to compute new routes
in order to reroute network traffic around the failed component, quiesce the
network (i.e. pause network traffic), install the newly computed network
routes on all ASICs, and finally unquiesce the network. As mentioned above,
it is possible for this failover process to fail.
This study does not explicitly model single-lane faults (due to a lack of a
method to directly cause such a failure). However, because there are three
lanes per link, a link failure is the same as three lane failures.
3.1.2 Single Injection: Connection
A connection fault models the failure of a network connection. Recall that a
connection, in a torus topology, such as Gemini, consists of either 8 links for
each X+, X-, Z+, Z- direction or 4 links for each Y+, Y- direction. Failing
a connection means failing or deactivating all the links between two Gemini
ASICs. This failure scenario is recreated by modifying the status flags of
all the links to be marked as unavailable or removed from service. Note
that from now on, what we call a connection refers to all links or all torus
connections in one connection direction, as shown in Figure 3.2.
The automated recovery process is the same as the link failover procedure,
which involves recalculating and rerouting network paths around the hole
created by the connection failure, quiescing the network, installing the new
network routes on all ASICs, and finally unquiescing the network. There are
some topologies that are unroutable and thus lead to a reroute failure [23],
but in general, no major system interruptions are expected.
30
Figure 3.2: Connection fault model, targeting one connection direction of a
Gemini ASIC. Two torus connections (lighter colored marked by black X’s)
are not used as connections for the HSN, but instead used internally to
communicate with the nodes. Note the distinction between a torus
connection and a connection direction.
3.1.3 Single Injection: Node
A node fault, as shown in Figure 3.3, models the failure of a compute node.
In this study, we were asked to not target service nodes due to their im-
portance for critical system services, but we do target XE and XK compute
nodes. We recreate this failure scenario by sending a system administrator
command that in turn sends a non-maskable interrupt (NMI) to the CPU to
cause it to hang. Any application running on this failed node would fail and
terminate. The failover process for a node is identical to that for a failed link
Figure 3.3: Node fault model, targeting one of the four nodes on a blade.
The blade shown is a Cray XE6.
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Figure 3.4: Blade fault model, targeting the whole blade and its components
by turning of the voltage regulators. The blade shown is a Cray XE6.
or connection.
Additionally, there is also no automated method to reboot a single node,
which limits obtaining a statistically significant number of node failure ex-
periments. The only way to reboot a node is through our automated method
for rebooting a whole blade or through manual interaction with the SMW.
Neither situation is ideal for realistic (a whole blade is never rebooted for a
single failed node), repeated experiments given limitations on access to the
SMW. For these reasons, there are few node failure experiments in this work.
These node failure results are reported together with blade (multiple node)
failure results as we did not observe any difference in system or application
behavior between the two types of faults.
3.1.4 Single Injection: Blade
A blade fault models the failure of a blade, which consists of four compute
nodes, two Gemini ASICs, and six network connection directions or 40 net-
work links in total. When a blade is shut down, all these components are
marked as down, which means any application(s) running on the failed blade
would also prematurely terminate. We recreate this failure scenario by send-
ing a system administrator command that turns off the voltage regulator of
the mezzanine in the blade, as shown in Figure 3.4.
The automated recovery process is expected to reroute around the two
failed Gemini ASIC routers just as in the failover procedures for the previ-
ously discussed fault models.
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3.1.5 Injection During Recovery
Injection during recovery is a model of multiple faults with one or more faults
injected during the failover recovery procedure of another single fault. One
goal of this study is to recreate the failed failover scenarios observed in Blue
Waters field data as well as the fault injections performed on Cielo. In those
systems, SWOs and network deadlocks were observed [6],[5],[15].
This model involves multiple faults, chosen from a combination of the
previously discussed single injection fault models. For example, a single
connection fault is injected as the initial fault to trigger a recovery process.
During recovery, a second connection fault is injected.
Behavior of the recovery processes when faults are injected during recovery
is not well documented nor understood. Subsequent chapters will discuss
results and observations of the system’s behavior and the resiliency of failover
processes under the stress of multiple faults.
3.2 Benchmark Applications
The main goal of this study is to assess the reliability and resiliency of HPC
systems in the presence of faults. One way to evaluate resiliency of HPC
systems is through observing the behavior of applications or benchmarks
running on the system. Being able to control applications running on the
system during experiments and having direct access to the applications’ log
outputs provides both a real-time monitor of application health as well as
a way to observe fault propagation through the rest of the system. This in
turn can help provide deeper insights of fault tolerance at the application and
system levels. To conduct fault injection experiments in environments that
are as realistic as possible, we chose various HPC benchmark applications to
generate varying levels of network and computational activity. The list of
benchmarks is shown in Table 3.1.
These applications were chosen to cover and evaluate resiliency of a spec-
trum of HPC programming frameworks, including Charm++, MPI, and
PGAS. These frameworks, in the context of fault tolerance, are discussed
in more detail in the following sections. These chosen applications cover
a wide range of scientific applications, such as particle physics, molecular
dynamics, and seismic simulations.
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The applications are executed at varying node scales and tuned to run for
approximately 30 to 40 minutes, which is sufficient time for one fault injection
and its corresponding recovery and restoration processes. For example, the
whole blade recovery and restoration procedure can take about 10 minutes
to complete. All applications are scaled to run on 64 nodes or less. This in
turn limits the applications that we could compile and run simply because
certain applications require the resources of more nodes than the testbed can
provide.
Beyond the work presented in this study, future work aims to compare
reliability and resiliency features and behavior across HPC systems with dif-
ferent interconnect architectures, such as the Aries Dragonfly Interconnect.
While discussion of the Aries interconnect and its details are beyond the
scope of this thesis, that ongoing work enforced another constraint on the
applications that were chosen in the later campaigns of this study. HPC
systems and testbeds owned by different organizations are configured with
certain programming environments and various versions, a flexibility pro-
vided by Cray. This flexibility, however, means that some systems have
different compiler and module versions, which further limits the applications
that we could compile and run for the comparison fault injection experiments
on Aries systems.
3.2.1 Charm++
Charm++ is a parallel programming framework based on the C++ pro-
gramming language, actively developed and maintained by the Parallel Pro-
gramming Laboratory at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Its key novel concepts include a message-driven execution model and an
adaptive runtime system in charge of migratable work and data units [26].
The applications we selected under Charm++ (AMR, Kripke, LeanMD, and
NAMD) utilize the user-level Generic Network Interface (uGNI) API, a na-
tive low-level interface for Gemini hardware on Cray XE/XK systems, with
shared-memory optimization pthreads and Cray HugePages modules [27].
Charm++ maintains fault tolerance only through the checkpoint and restart
mechanism, making use of its novelty of migratable objects, but even the de-
velopers are skeptical whether this checkpoint/restart scheme is enough for
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Table 3.1: Benchmark applications information [25].
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exascale systems where failure rates are expected to increase significantly
[28],[29].
3.2.2 Message Passing Interface
The Message Passing Interface (MPI) is an efficient, scalable, and vendor-
independent specification for message-passing parallel programming libraries.
It is the industry standard for message passing parallel programs running on
virtually any parallel computing hardware platform, including HPC plat-
forms. MPI supports point-to-point and collective communication routines
[30]. There are multiple implementations of the MPI standard; our chosen
MPI applications, AWP-ODC, MILC, and PSDNS cover three implementa-
tions: PGI, Intel, and Cray, respectively.
The MPI Standard itself does not consider fault tolerance as a property
of the standard itself nor of any MPI implementation on its own. While the
developers assert that fault tolerance is a property of MPI programs cou-
pled with MPI implementations, the MPI Standard nevertheless still speci-
fies reliable communication [31]. This means that all MPI implementations
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must detect and handle network faults (e.g. through retransmission of the
message, informing the application of the presence of an error, etc.). The
standard also specifies certain error handlers, but the handlers can either
be built in or user defined [31]. In general, the standard itself allows for
flexibility in implementation when it comes to fault tolerance. Suggestions
for writing fault-tolerant programs include checkpointing and use of MPI’s
intercommunicators to ensure survivability if one party has failed and ceased
communication [31].
3.2.3 Partitioned Global Address Space
The Partitioned Global Address Space (PGAS) is yet another parallel pro-
gramming model, but one that aims to combine the advantages of both
distributed-memory models (performance and locality) and shared-memory
models (simplicity and programmability) [32]. It provides a global address
space, which is shared and accessible by any process yet also partitioned such
that portions are local to each processing element, process, or thread [32].
There are various PGAS languages; this work focuses on Unified Parallel C,
a programming PGAS-like language descended from the C language [32].
It is known that PGAS applications are susceptible to network failures
[5]. This vulnerability stems from requiring atomic memory operations and
ordered message delivery [5]. Lost transactions during link failures, such as
loss of response, are not tolerated and can lead to a duplicate transaction
to be present. Messages that arrive out of order will also disrupt the ap-
plication’s forward progress. DMAPP is a communication library used by
UPC-FT. It provides remote memory access (RMA) between processes, but
it does not support error recovery in the presence of link failures, leaving it
up to applications to handle the error.
3.3 Fault Injection Toolkit: HPCArrow
To investigate the fault-to-failure propagation and the impact of faults on
systems and applications, we developed a SWIFI-based tool called HPCAr-
row. This toolkit systematically executes fault injections on Cray systems
with both Gemini and Aries interconnects. Fault injection experiments aim
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Figure 3.5: Architecture environment of the fault injection experiments,
depicting the modules of the HPCArrow toolkit and their interactions
within the Cray System, including the final output logs.
to create failure scenarios that emulate actual permanent faults at the hard-
ware component level.
HPCArrow provides the advantage of a controllable and repeatable injec-
tion environment. The toolkit can inject one or more faults of any fault type
(link, component, node, blade) into either a random or user-specified location
at a random or user-specified time. It also supports the specific restoration
commands to automatically restore the system back to an unaffected, fault-
free state after each injection experiment. Note that restoration is different
from the system’s automatic failover recovery procedure. Failover is the sys-
tem’s response to mask out or reroute around the failed component(s) as
much as possible to minimize disruption of system service; it does not fix
the failed component itself. Restoration is a manual procedure for which a
system administrator is responsible. Restoration must be manually triggered
in order to return the failed component back into service.
This toolkit comprises three main modules, which are described in detail
in the next few sections. The workflow of the toolkit in tandem with the
target system is illustrated in Figure 3.5.
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3.3.1 Workload Manager
Application workloads are configured, launched, and logged by the Workload
Manager module to simulate real network and computational activity on a
target system. An application can be launched at user-specified locations on
the target system and at various user-specified scales. Multiple applications
can be launched simultaneously as well.
In this study, the Workload Manager supports as small as two-node ap-
plications (smallest allowable size on JYC) up to 64 nodes at intervals of
powers of 2 (2, 4, 8, etc.). Due to NCSA restricting our system reservation
to the top two chassi, 64 nodes is the largest size available. Regardless of
scale, every application is configured for about 30-40 minutes of run time.
Every application has its own unique parameters to configure for scaling and
run time. See Appendix D for details on these parameters.
The various workload sizes, topology placement, node types, and application-
specific runtime parameters are enumerated in YAML configuration files that
can be easily modified or extended by the user. Through these configura-
tion files, the Workload Manager module can generate job submission scripts
tailored to support various target systems with different resource managers,
cluster job workload management packages, or job schedulers. Currently, it
supports Moab/TORQUE for JYC/Blue Waters.
3.3.2 Fault Injector
The Fault Injector module is responsible for performing the fault injections
by executing the system-specific commands to take down network or com-
pute components. This can be either a random selection of a component
(by the tool) or a user-specified component. These selection methods will
be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4. In the case of multiple fault
injections, this module handles timing the fault injections either based on a
user-specified delay or through monitoring system logs to inject faults during
recovery procedures. The injector is also responsible for invoking the appro-
priate restoration procedure corresponding to the fault that was injected.
Fault injection and system restoration are executed via system-specific
commands. In this work, those are Cray administrative commands, which
are issued from the SMW where this Fault Injector module runs in the back-
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ground. The injector extracts both the user-specified target component(s)
and injection timing delay from the names of currently running jobs. It then
looks up the parameters and commands for performing both the injection and
restoration phases of the injection experiment and executes those commands.
Tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B detail the injection and restoration com-
mands, respectively. Throughout each experiment, the injector constantly
logs injection and restoration commands as well as standard output and er-
rors and stores these outputs in text files. These are the injector logs.
Because the fault injector calls Cray-specific administrative commands to
inject faults, this module can be modified to incorporate other low-level HPC
fault injection frameworks that can be triggered by an executable program
or shell script.
3.3.3 Injection Manager
The Injection Manager is a daemon-like module responsible for monitoring
the target system’s ALPS queue to ensure space for applications and that
no other unintended jobs are running during an injection experiment. This
module also watches for jobs started by pre-specified user(s). The presence
of jobs started by a pre-specified user signals the Injection Manager to ini-
tiate an injection experiment. If an injection is specified via the job names,
the Injection Manager parses the job name and subsequently triggers the
injection through the Fault Injector module. At a later pre-specified time,
the Injection Manager also collects the appropriate injection logs and system
logs that are on the SMW and inaccessible to a normal user. This workflow
is illustrated in Figure 3.6.
Due to restrictions of JYC usage for fault injections, the Injection Manager
ensures limited user intervention, meaning that we do not have to manually
run injection or restoration commands, nor do we have to be logged in on
administrator accounts on the SMW. To trigger an injection experiment as
a user, the target component type(s) and name(s) are specified in the job
names that are submitted to the job scheduler. The injection delay and re-
covery stage is also specified here as well. The Injection Manager, which is
monitoring the job queue from the SMW, parses the job names to determine
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Figure 3.6: Workflow of the Injection Manager module of the HPCArrow
toolkit. The Injection Manager continuously runs on the SMW like a
daemon and must be started by the system administrator.
lines the parts that the injector parses in order for us to remotely execute an
injection experiment without needing to have constant administrator privi-
leges and access to the SMW. A list of seen and injected jobs is kept by the
Injection Manager temporarily to ensure that it does not inject more than
once on the same set of jobs. In addition, the Injection Manager also ensures
that fault injections are only executed during the allocated reservation hours
and that all injection, system, and performance logs, which are normally
restricted behind system administrator privileges, are made available to a
pre-specified user via a log transfer script.
This Injection Manager is an optional module, tailored to our needs and to
workaround certain restrictions. The rest of HPCArrow can be run directly
on the SMW without running the Injection Manager. Similarly, the log
transfer script does not need the Injection Manager to run as it is a simple
shell script used to collect all logs.
3.4 Data Collected
To assess the impact of the proposed fault injections on both the system and
its running applications, we collect and analyze system-generated logs, mon-
itoring and performance data, application outputs, and injection experiment
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logs. This data is provided by various collection and aggregation services,
including the fault injection toolkit that was discussed in the previous sec-
tion. The data generated by applications launched on the system without
injections or presence of any faults were used as our golden outputs in order
to compare against for the later fault injection experiment outputs. These
golden logs and outputs were also used to identify the most utilized compo-
nents on which to inject faults. Analysis of all this data collectively provides
a quantifiable way to observe and describe system and application behavior
in the presence of faults.
3.4.1 Event Analysis: LogDiver
The system logs that we collect are generated by Cray logging daemons that
are always running on the system at various levels, including the SMW and
cabinet and blade controllers. They are typically started during system boot,
although some may need to be manually turned on by the system adminis-
trator. These logs contain information on the network, system, hardware
components, and the SMW itself. Table 3.2 describes the specific system
logs collected and analyzed for this work.
To parse and identify the events and information necessary to evaluate
resiliency, we use a tool called LogDiver.1 It is a tool designed for analyzing
application-level resiliency in extreme-scale environments based on system
and hardware error logs on Blue Waters [34]. In this work, we utilize Log-
Diver to extract network failover recover stages and hardware errors to verify
the completion statuses of recoveries and restorations, and to diagnose both
abnormal application terminations (crashes and hangs) and recovery failures.
To accomplish this, LogDiver filters based on pre-configured regular expres-
sions (regex) that match with pre-specified events of interest in the collected
system logs. The regexes were assembled from manual inspection of events
in collected logs.
1LogDiver was developed by Catello Di Martino and Saurabh Jha at the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) based off of data produced by Blue Waters.
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Table 3.2: Cray system logs [33] collected and analyzed in this work.
Log Name Description
commands All commands, excluding xtdiscover, executed on the
SMW.
events HSS-wide events, health and heartbeats, and sequence
identifiers; recorded by the event router.
hwerrlog Hardware error events in the ASIC network chip; the
xthwerrlogd daemon monitors for these errors.
netwatch Link control block (LCB) and router errors; the xtnet-
watch daemon monitors the system HSN faults inter-
connect for these errors.
nlrd HSN failures, recovery actions taken and phases in event
of failures, warm swap requests, and HSN congestion;
the network link resiliency daemon (nlrd) monitors blade
controllers for these events.
smwmessages SMW hardware and environmental history.
xtdiscover Output from running xtdiscover command on the SMW,
used to detect Cray system hardware components and to
capture changes in hardware configurations in the HSS.
Netwatch Events
The xtnetwatch daemon collects interconnect metadata from the system
HSN, logging link control block (LCB) and router errors. Such events, de-
scribed in Table 3.3, include mode exchanges, transmitting and receiving
packets, inactive links, bad send EOP error, send packet length error, and
routing table corruptions.
Nlrd Events
The xtnlrd daemon logs interconnect failures, recovery actions taken in re-
sponse to those failures, and details of each phase of recovery. It also logs
warm swap stages and network congestion events. The events of interest,
described in Table 3.4, include the recovery stages of the failover protocols,
which were discussed in the previous chapter. This information is used to
verify the success of failovers and warm swaps or detect abnormal network
responses to fault injections.
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Table 3.3: Netwatch error events of interest during analysis.
Event Description
Link Inactive A link has failed and has been marked as inactive.
Bad Send EOP error On Gemini interconnects, each packet is divided into
24-bit physical units (phits), always with the last phit
of a packet serving as the end of packet phit [17]. A
corrupted packet will have its end of packet phit marked
to be discarded at its destination.
Send Packet Length error The length of a packet does not match with the expected
length at the packet’s destination.
Routing Table Corruption
error
Every router contains a routing table, which holds the
forwarding information for incoming packets. An incom-
ing packet is matched to the routing table entry using
its destination. If a routing table is corrupted, pack-
ets may reach incorrect destinations, link failures may
occur, and network congestion may arise.
Table 3.4: Nlrd network and recovery events of interest during analysis.
Event Description
Link Failed A link has failed.
ASIC Failed An ASIC router has failed. Typically seen when a blade
fails.
Link Recovery Successful A link failover finished successfully. This is a generic
message even for blade and connection failures since
they all involve link failures.
Link Recovery Failed A failover failed.
Network Quiesced All traffic is temporarily suspended and any in-flight
packets are drained from the network.
Network Unquiesced All traffic is allowed to resume.
Throttle The network is experiencing congestion and all blades
are instructed to throttle traffic.
Unthrottle Network congestion has been handled and all blades are
instructed to unthrottle network bandwidth.
Warm Swap Successful A warm swap restoration procedure finished success-
fully.
Warm Swap Failed A warm swap restoration procedure failed to restore a
component back into service.
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Hwerrlog Events
The xthwerrlogd daemon monitors and logs for hardware error events that
occur on ASIC network chips. The errors of interest, described in Table 3.5,
are related to network deadlocks observed in field data [15]. Netwatch events
are also reported in these hardware logs.
Table 3.5: Hardware error events of interest during analysis.
Event Description
LB Lack of Forward Progress Traffic flow is stopped through a NIC and packets are
discarded. This may indicate a severe network issue if
this error is generated across the entire network. It is
not critical if contained in a small set of routers.
NIF Squashed from Tile Request Packets are squashed due to failed consistency checks
(e.g. ECC, CRC, misroute). This may indicate packet
corruption or bad routing.
ORB RAM Scrubbed Upper/Lower
Entry
If a network request times out, it is scrubbed or removed
from the Output Request Buffer (ORB). ORB can free
the upper 64 entries or the lower 64 entries of the ORB
RAM as shown in the names. This is a transient hard-
ware error, but if continuously generated in the logs, it
could mean a severe problem with the network, such as
a deadlock.
ORB Request with No Entry A response packet is received, but does not correspond
to a request entry in the ORB RAM. This is a critical
error as it may indicate a routing table corruption.
Receiver 8b10b Error This indicates a transmission error.
SSID Response RequestTimeout This error can result from failed HSN components, a
failure of the node to which the request was sent, or a
transient error that results in a packet being discarded.
It could also result from severe network congestion and
can be an indication of a network deadlock when it per-
sists over a long period of time.
SSID Response Protocol Error This is a complex error, sometimes indicating network
problems. It can be seen during network re-routing trig-
gered by quiescing. It can also be triggered by process
termination interrupting the Gemini low-level protocol.
SSID Detected Misrouted Packet The destination field in the packet does not match the
endpoint at which the packet has been received. This
can be caused by a routing problem in the network or a
mis-addressed packet (bad/invalid NIC address).
SSID Stale on Response, SSID Stale A warm swap restoration procedure finished success-
fully.
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3.4.2 Network Performance Counters
Many Cray systems, including Blue Waters, are beginning to utilize a high
fidelity, global system monitoring module called OVIS,2 which aims to de-
tect and diagnose abnormal system behavior or limitations and to provide
system-level insight into resource utilization (e.g. how the network is utilized,
stressed, or congested). OVIS contains a service called the the Lightweight
Distributed Metric Service (LDMS), which collects and transports network
performance data [35]. This service logs numerical network performance
(throughput in bytes/second) in the X+, X-, Y+, Y-, Z+, and Z- directions
for each Gemini on the target system. In this study, LDMS is configured
to sample traffic data (in bytes/second) at one-second intervals. Due to low
overhead, LDMS can be deployed across an entire HPC platform without
any significant detrimental impact on the system itself [35]. However, LDMS
is not resilient against network failures (due to needing to aggregate data
collected on each node) and node failures (the service itself runs on service
nodes). Data is collected by on-node daemons and held in memory on a node
until they are overwritten by the next sample. It is pulled from memory by
other daemons via RDMA. During node failures, the data collected by on-
node daemons are lost if memory is overwritten or lost. During failures in
the HSN, i.e. during a network quiescence, data points that would have been
collected in that period are dropped.
In this work, we use LDMS network data for guiding component injection
selection in our fault injection campaigns on JYC. Based on traffic data from
pre-run applications, we select components with the maximum throughput
traffic in order to ensure that a single component injection will yield the most
impact on the system. We also utilize LDMS network data for diagnosing
abnormal application behavior (e.g. observing whether there is traffic during
application hangs).
Figure 3.7 shows an example timeplot of LDMS traffic data collected for
one normal (i.e. without injections or abnormal system behavior) run of a
Charm++ NAMD application on 4 nodes. Based on this plot, we can visually
see that the connection direction with the highest traffic is the Z- direction
on node nid00060.
2The OVIS Project is developed by SNL in collaboration with NCSA and Cray Inc.
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Figure 3.7: Example of LDMS traffic data collected for one run of a NAMD
application without injection.
3.4.3 Application Outputs and Injection Logs
Having various applications running on the system is also key to assessing
resiliency of application frameworks in the presence of faults. Every work-
load run information is redirected from stdout and stderr to one or more
logs. These application-specific outputs may contain information such as
timestamps, computation steps and timings, exit statuses, and any abnor-
mal or critical errors. Information reported by the ALPS is also redirected
into these logs. These include network quiescence and throttling events when
automatic failure recoveries or manual warm swap procedures are invoked.
The Injection Manager module also outputs it own set of injection logs,
collecting book-keeping information regarding injection experiments. This
includes timestamps, jobs running on the queue, jobs and/or components
selected for injection, and redirected information from stdout and stderr on
the SMW.
We use these application and injection logs as another avenue of informa-
tion to correlate system-level failures and recoveries to fault injection events
that occur during workload runs. They also help diagnose the causes of
abnormal application behaviors and termination as other studies on HPC





This chapter details fault injection campaigns conducted on Blue Waters’
96-node JYC testbed. A campaign consists of a set of experiments that are
thematically unified in injection type (number of injections), fault selection
methodology, fault model types, fault injection timing (either seconds after
all applications start or during user-specified recovery stages), and applica-
tions. These are outlined for each campaign in Table 4.1 and discussed in
detail in this chapter.
Across the fault injection campaigns on JYC, a total of 321 experiments
were executed, collected, and analyzed. Out of 321, 30 were baseline runs
without injections, which were used as the golden outputs or data as com-
parison reference for later experiments’ outputs. The remaining were fault
injection experiments. These experiments spanned seven months and took
about 9030 node-hours.1 The following sections detail the experimental
setup, which covers application configurations and injection selection meth-
ods applied across the campaigns. Each campaign and its results are then
presented in separate sections.
4.1 Experimental Setup
4.1.1 Applications and Topology Configurations
As discussed in the previous chapter, applications are used as one perspective
to assess system resiliency under the stress of faults. This portion of the
experiments necessitates a great deal of setup time, including compilation
1A node-hour is a unit of work that an HPC node performs in one hour. More generally,
this means that an application ran for a Walltime of t hours on n nodes, e.g. two nodes
running 0.5 hour each = one node-hour.
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and parameter adjustments for scale, node types, and time. See Appendix
D for details on these parameters. Due to the duration of failover and warm
swap procedures, which can take about 10-15 minutes for a single blade
fault, applications were preconfigured to run for about 30 to 40 minutes.
Applications are also preconfigured with a Walltime, which specifies the
maximum amount of time the application can run regardless of completion
of computations. This parameter is set to be two hours for all application
runs across the four campaigns. Combined, these two constraints dictate
the duration of experiments: one experiment run can be as fast as about 33
minutes and another as long as two hours. This upper bound, which is often
reached by certain applications and faults, is the limiting factor on running
a statistically significant number of repeated experiments.
In total, nine different applications were compiled and executed on JYC.
These nine were split and mixed to construct two sets of applications: one
used in Campaign I as a proof of concept and the other used in all subsequent
campaigns. Applications are varied in workload sizes (i.e. the number of
nodes they run on), which are powers of two, ranging from as small as two
nodes up to 64 nodes. These limitations are set by JYC scheduler (two nodes)
and NCSA restrictions (2 chassis = 64 nodes). Applications are also varied
in placement around the system. While fault injections are limited to the top
two chassis of JYC to avoid disrupting service nodes as requested by NCSA,
applications are still placed in the bottom chassis in some configurations to
watch for fault propagation.
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Figure 4.1: Application Configuration 1 on JYC for Fault Injection
Campaign 1. Grayed-out nodes are unused nodes.
Application Set I. Campaign I features six applications: AMR (SMP),
AMR (HugePages), AWP-ODC, LeanMD (HugePages), Kripke (HugePages),
and UPC-FT. Campaign I consisted of five various application topology lay-
outs or configurations, covering various workload sizes, topology placements,
and topology density of applications. Figure 4.1 shows an example configura-
tion of how applications were laid out in Configuration 1. Grayed out nodes
are unused nodes. Refer to Appendix D for the other four configurations
used in Campaign I.
Application Set II. Campaign II also features six applications: AMR
(HugePages), LeanMD (HugePages), Kripke (HugePages), MILC, NAMD
(SMP), and PSDNS. Note that three of them (MILC, NAMD, and PSDNS)
are unique from those executed in Campaign I. From this set of applications,
we constructed three various application topology layouts or configurations,
covering various workload sizes, topology placements, and topology density of
applications. Figure 4.2 shows an example configuration of how applications
were laid out in the Dense Configuration, filling up nearly every compute
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Figure 4.2: Dense Application Configuration on JYC for Fault Injection
Campaign 2. Grayed-out nodes are unused nodes.
node of the JYC system (grayed-out nodes are unused nodes or service nodes
that cannot be used by users). The change from five different configurations
to three is simply due to time constraints and the need to run the same
experiments repeatedly. These same applications and configurations used in
Campaign II are reused in Campaigns III and IV to maintain consistency
and repeatability. Refer to Appendix D for the other two configurations
constructed from this set of applications.
4.1.2 Injection Selection Method
Random Selection
Faults in Campaign I were injected on randomly selected components. HP-
CArrow’s Injection Manager monitors the system job queue and assembles
a list of jobs currently running. It randomly selects a job from the list and
then, depending on the fault type and the workload size, it randomly selects
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Table 4.2: Random injection selection method for each fault type, which
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a component on which the targeted job is running. Table 4.2 enumerates
the selection process for each fault type. For example, if the user specifies a
link injection, then a random job is selected. If the targeted job is running
on four nodes, then it covers two Geminis’ worth of links. A random link
from among the links between the two Geminis is selected for take-down or
injection.
Traffic-Based Selection
For Campaigns II, III, and IV, the selection process of a target component
was based on the maximum utilization of network components over the course
of five no-injection runs of an application configuration. This methodology
focuses solely on the components that utilize the most network resources.
This ensures that we choose the fault injections with maximal impact on the
system and on the applications running on it.
As discussed in the previous chapter, LDMS logs traffic throughput (in
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Table 4.3: Targeted injection selection method for each fault type, which is












Blade attached to con-
nection with highest
throughput
bytes/second) in the X+, X-, Y+, Y-, Z+, and Z- directions2 for each Gem-
ini on the target system. Each of the three workload configurations were run
without injections and profiled, using the LDMS data, to determine which ap-
plications and corresponding connection directions generated the most traffic
on the network. On a time series plot of the LDMS data, connection compo-
nents with the maximum throughput activity can be visually identified and
selected for injection.
For links and blades, the methodology is similar. While LDMS data only
tracks traffic at the connection direction granularity, the same traffic data can
easily be re-used and extended to determine which links and blades to target.
In particular, the links that form the connection with the highest throughput
are target candidates; the blades that are attached to the connection with
the highest throughput are target candidates. Table 4.3 enumerates the
selection process for each fault type. This method is independent of the
workload size or number of Geminis, but it must be computed offline from
golden outputs. The Injection Manager does not do anything beyond monitor
the job queue and trigger the fault injection whose injection type, fault type,
and component name are user-specified. Future work should involve real-
time monitoring of live LDMS data and real-time component selection based
on the workloads running on the HPC system.
To illustrate, we discuss a NAMD Charm++ application running on 16
nodes. Figure 4.3 shows time series plots of the traffic throughput over the
course of the workload’s execution on each of the 16 nodes (the graph is
truncated to 6 nodes for readability). Note that since JYC is a one cabi-
net system, the plots leave out the X+/- connection directions. The target
2LDMS only tracks at the granularity of connections. It does not track utilization of
specific links themselves.
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component can be identified by visually finding the node with the connection
direction that has the highest sustained traffic throughput. In this case, there
are two pairs of candidates: nodes nid00032 and nid00033, corresponding to
Gemini c0-0c1s0g1, as well as nodes nid00060 and nid00061, corresponding
to Gemini c0-0c1s1g0, show the highest sustained throughput in the Z+ and
Z directions, respectively. Since they are roughly similar, either Gemini is
a suitable target candidate. Here, Gemini c0-0c1s0g1 is arbitrarily chosen,
which means the Z+ connection (c0-0c1s0g1,Z+) is targeted for the connec-
tion fault injection on this NAMD application. Since the Z+ connection has
eight possible links, three links are randomly pre-selected: in this case, we
chose c0-0c1s0g1l01, c0-0c1s0g1l10, and c0-0c1s0g1l27. If it were the Y+
direction, which has four links, three links would still randomly be chosen
as well. For the node injection, one of the two nodes is arbitrarily chosen.
And finally, for the blade injection, the blade that houses the Gemini c0-
0c1s0g1 is targeted, which in this case is c0-0c1s0. See Appendix E for all
the components that were targeted using this traffic-based selection method.
4.1.3 Experiment Timeline
In a fault injection campaign, running an experiment requires a couple pre-
steps. Prior to execution, a user configures and builds an application set
through HPCArrow’s Workload Manager module. The user specifies the
injection type, fault type(s), component name(s), recovery target stage (if
needed), and timing delay (if needed) through the applications’ job names.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the timeline of an experiment once preconfiguration
is completed and the applications begin to run. At time T = 0, the user-
selected applications are submitted to ALPS to be run on JYC. The Fault
Injector module waits until F seconds have elapsed before injecting the first
fault. F is composed of two delays: F = P + D. For our experiments, P is
pre-set by us to be 120 seconds. This is to allow time for all the applications
to complete initialization and settle into a steady state flow of computations.
The injector then waits an additional D seconds, a delay that is by default 100
seconds or specified by the user in the job name. For all campaigns, except
for Campaign III, we leave the delay as its default value. After this, the user-
specified fault is injected. After R seconds have elapsed, the failover recovery
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Figure 4.3: LDMS traffic data for every connection direction is plotted for
each node on which a NAMD Charm++ application using 16 nodes
(truncated to six for readability) runs. The traffic based selection method
chooses the highest throughput connection. Such candidates are on nodes





























































Figure 4.5: A general injection during recovery experiment timeline for
Campaign IV.
procedure is automatically triggered by the SMW. R is the time it takes for
the SMW to respond to the fault and is not configurable from our end. It
is usually instantaneous, taking no more than a second for failover to begin.
The failover computes new routes to reroute around the fault while quiescing
the HSN. It installs the new routes and then finally unquieces the HSN. An
application may crash, hang, or continue as usual during failover. Failover
usually takes about 30 seconds. In the case of an injection during recovery
experiment, the injector watches for a target recovery stage in the network
logs and injects a second fault upon detection during this 30 second window
as shown in Figure 4.5. At time T = F + R + M , the Fault Injector module
invokes the manual restore procedure to re-initialize the failed component
and warm-swap it back into service. During the warm swap procedure, new
routes are computed, the HSN is quiesced, the new routes are installed, and
the HSN is unquiesced again. M is pre-set by us to be 200 seconds, which
gives the failover ample time to complete. The experiment ends when all
jobs in the application set terminate, usually between 30-40 minutes or up
to two hours (in the case of a hung application).
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4.2 Fault Injection Campaign I
The purpose of Campaign I3 was to serve as a proof of concept for our
fault injection methodology and to observe JYC’s behavior and resiliency
to the simplest of failures, single fault injections. Target components were
randomly selected as discussed in previous sections. Six different benchmark
applications from Application Set I were run during these experiments. The
experiences and results gained from this set of experiments helped to refine
the methodology and experimental setup for later campaigns.
4.2.1 Summary Results
In Campaign I, there was a total of 63 experiments on JYC. Out of 63, 18
were baseline runs without injections. The remaining 45 were injection exper-
iments: 13 link injections, 16 connection injections, and 16 blade injections.
Recall that the first step of the random selection method is to randomly
select an application before randomly selecting a component. Each fault is
thus injected into a component that is utilized by an application A. From the
perspective of application A, we call this a direct injection. Thus, an indirect
injection would be a fault that is injected on a component that application
A is not directly utilizing.
In the presence of faults, direct or indirect, applications can behave in
various ways. In this work, we focus on an application’s run status and run
time. An application’s run status refers to whether the application com-
pleted its computations without impact. Specifically, the outcomes are (1)
crash, which is when an application terminates prematurely or abnormally,
(2) hang, which is when an application makes no forward progress, (3) silent
data corruption, which is when the application runs to completion, but its
outputs do not match the golden outputs, or (4) no impact.
Table 4.4 and its corresponding plot in Figure 4.6 show only the application
run statuses as a result of direct injections. All applications in this campaign
experience no impact as a result of indirect injections. Thus we focus here
only on direct injections. See Appendix F for the full summary, including
indirect faults.
3Development and execution of Campaign I was a joint effort with Lavin Devnani, who
also presents the work from Campaign I in his thesis [36].
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Figure 4.6: Summary percentages of Campaign I’s direct injections and
application run statuses, grouped by fault type and benchmark. Refer to
Table 4.4 for counts.
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Table 4.4: Summary of Campaign I, showing the outcomes (Crash, Hang,
No Impact) of applications that are directly injected with various fault
types (Blade, Connection, Link). See Appendix F for the full summary,
including indirect faults.
Benchmark Application Fault Type
Run Status #(%)




Blade 2 (100.0) 0 0
Connection 0 0 2 (100.0)
Kripke
Blade 1 (100.0) 0 0
Connection 0 1 (100.0) 0
Link 0 2 (100.0) 0
LeanMD
Blade 3 (100.0) 0 0
Connection 2 (100.0) 0 0




Blade 5 (100.0) 0 0
Connection 5 (100.0) 0 0
Link 4 (100.0) 0 0
MPI AWP-ODC
Blade 3 (100.0) 0 0
Connection 0 0 3 (100.0)
Link 0 0 3 (100.0)
PGAS UPC-FT
Blade 2 (100.0) 0 0
Connection 2 (66.67) 0 1 (33.33)
Link 3 (100.0) 0 0
4.2.2 Failure Scenarios
In this campaign, we covered single fault types from link to blade. While
components are chosen randomly, we still repeat experiments. For each of
the five application configurations from Set I, we run each of the fault in-
jection types three times each. In this section, we present case experiments
for a single injection on a compute component and a single injection on a
network component. For each case, we examine resiliency behaviors at the
application, network, and system levels.
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Blade and Node Faults
For all blade and node injections, it is expected that an application using
the targeted blade or node will crash simply because one or more compute
components are not available. These fault injection outcomes are reflected
in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.6 in which every direct blade injection always led
to an application crash. We present a case blade fault experiment here.
In Experiment 42, blade c0-0c2s5 was targeted. Recall that when a blade is
taken out of service, the two Gemini ASICs (c0-0c2s5g0, c0-0c2s5g1) housed
by the blade fail as well, causing a cascade of link failures across all outgoing
links and links connected at the other ends. Thus 40 link failures were
expected to be observed.
This blade fault directly impacted and prematurely terminated the 32-node
AWP-ODC application running on the top chassis. All other applications
continued to run to completion as normal. The targeted application’s outputs
reported several instances of Generic TCP Error across nodes 74, 75, 84,
and 85. The following message was also logged, which is typically generated
when a node or blade fails with some hardware error (e.g. memory check
error) [37]:
[NID 00064] 2018-03-15 21:50:03 Apid 614720 killed. Received node
event ec_node_failed for nid 74
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 illustrate the timeline of events at the experiment level
(application and injection timings and durations) and at the network level,
respectively. From t = 0 to t = 341.205, there was a sustained flow of traffic
across all eight blades that AWP-ODC was running on as shown by the blue
line in Figure 4.8a. At t = 341.205, the blade fault was injected, which caused
Gemini c0-0c2s5g0 and c0-0c2s5g1 to fail in every connection direction. This
caused the application to die as can be observed more clearly in Figure 4.8b
when all traffic died after the fault injection. In response, all network traffic
was quiesced while the automatic failover rerouted around the failed blade.
This failover completed at t = 391.0. Traffic for the network resumed across
the system for non-impacted applications except for the Geminis that the
killed application had been running on. At t = 543, the injector initiated
the warm swap procedure, which completed at t = 967.732 and successfully
returned the blade back into service. The spike was likely residual traffic
leftover from before the fault.
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Figure 4.7: Timeline of Experiment 42 with a single blade injection. The
digits after each application name indicate the number of nodes the
application ran on.
Examining network recovery logs as shown in Table 4.5 confirmed the
normal completion of the failover recovery and the warm swap restoration.
There were 40 link failures as expected, one successful link recovery (all links
are handled in one recovery process), and one successful warm swap. From
the hardware error logs, there were a variety of errors, some with an enormous
count. The SSID Request Timeouts, SSID Response Protocol, SSID Detected
Misrouted Packet, ORB RAM Scrubbed, NIF Squashed Request Packet,
and NW (netwatch) errors all indicate network packets being dropped or
misrouted intentionally by the routing algorithm due to the blade failure.
All of these errors were transient and disappeared once failover successfully
completed, leaving no indication of any critical problems in the system and
network.
Link and Connection Faults
For single link and single connection faults, outcomes of application run
statuses were more varied, especially for Charm++ and PGAS applications.
Crashes were observed among AMR (SMP), LeanMD, and UPC-FT. Even
more surprising, hangs were observed for link and connection injections into
Kripke and LeanMD. In this section, we present a case experiment of a single
link injection that results in an application crash. We leave examination and
discussion of the hang case for the next section on Campaign II.
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(a) Cumulative traffic plot of Experiment 42 with a single blade injection.
(b) Traffic plot of a 32-node AWP-ODC application run in Experiment 42, with
focus on two out of the four nodes on the injected blade (left out for readability
and space).
Figure 4.8: Traffic plots of Experiment 42 with a single blade injection.
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Table 4.5: Summary of system logs for Experiment 42 (single blade fault).
Event Count
Link Failed 40






Warm Swap Successful 1
ORB RAM Scrubbed Lower Entry 24
ORB RAM Scrubbed Upper Entry 24
SSID Detected Misrouted Packet 52
SSID Request Timeout 7497
SSID Response Protocol 105
NIF Squashed Request Packet 44
NW Exchange from SUPR to RUN 10
NW Link Went Inactive 40
NW Send EOP Bad 10
In Experiment 46, link c0-0c2s0g0l17 was targeted. Recall that when a
link is taken out of service, the link on the other end (c0-0c2s7g0l27) is also
taken down. Thus we expected two links to fail in this experiment.
This link fault directly impacted and prematurely terminated the 32-node
UPC-FT application running on the top chassis. All other applications con-
tinued to run to completion as normal. The targeted application’s outputs
reported instances of DMAPP RC TRANSACTION ERROR: Transaction failed
across nodes c0-0c2s0n0 and c0-0c2s7n2, which contain the failed links as
shown below:
PE 480: ERROR: dmapp_syncid_wait( hdl ): DMAPP_RC_TRANSACTION_ERROR
: Transaction failed.
PE 15: ERROR: dmapp_syncid_wait( hdl ): DMAPP_RC_TRANSACTION_ERROR:
Transaction failed.
[NID 00064] Apid 618722: initiated application termination
This error means that the network transaction completed with an error
state, either a non-recoverable transaction error or a transient error, such
as network error, uncorrectable memory error, or resource shortage [38]. In
short, the link fault naturally caused transactions to fail. The rest of the log
messages record the application crash.
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate the timeline of events at the experiment level
and at the network level, respectively. From t = 0 to t = 440.584, there was
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Figure 4.9: Timeline of Experiment 46 with a single link injection.
a sustained flow of traffic across all eight blades that UPC-FT was running
on as shown by the blue line in Figure 4.10a. At t = 440.584, the link fault
was injected, which caused the application to die as shown by the red and
blue lines in Figure 4.10a4 flattening. This is more apparent when looking
at traffic for the Gemini (two nodes) whose link was injected on in Figure
4.10b. In response to the fault, all network traffic was quiesced while the
automatic failover rerouted around the failed link. This failover completed
at t = 479.0. Traffic for the network resumes across the system for non-
impacted applications. The warm swap procedure completed at t = 700.65
and successfully returns the blade back into service.
Examining network recovery logs as shown in Table 4.6 confirmed the
normal completion of the failover recovery and of the warm swap restoration.
There were two link failures as expected, one successful link recovery, and
one successful warm swap. From the hardware error logs, we observed errors
similar to those in the blade fault experiment discussed above. However,
since there were only two link failures, the frequency of these events are
much less in this case. Overall, the network and system recovered without
any residual critical errors.
4It may seem odd that the cumulative traffic plot shows that the single UPC-FT ap-
plication had more overall traffic than the rest of the applications. This is due to many
nodes not having the LDMS data collector enabled by the system administrator at the
time.
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(a) Cumulative traffic plot of Experiment 46 with a single link injection.
(b) Traffic plot of a 32-node UPC-FT application run in Experiment 46, with
focus on one Gemini (two nodes shown) whose link was targeted for injection.
Figure 4.10: Traffic plots of Experiment 46 with a single link injection.
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Table 4.6: Summary of system logs for Experiment 46 (single link fault).
Event Count
Link Failed 2






Warm Swap Successful 1
ORB RAM Scrubbed Lower Entry 9
ORB RAM Scrubbed Upper Entry 9
SSID Request Timeout 69
SSID Response Protocol 1
NW Exchange from SUPR to RUN 1
NW Link Went Inactive 2
4.3 Fault Injection Campaign II
Campaign I was the proof of concept for our fault injection approach and for
our injector tool HPCArrow. However, the randomness of experiments and
the limited number of experiments provided little sense of predictability in
terms of application and system behavior, especially in the presence of link
and connection faults. Our research project was also expanding to consider
other more modern HPC systems, such as the Aries interconnect. Thus,
there are two main reasons for this second fault injection campaign.
The first reason is related to the modification of the injection selection
methodology from random (Campaign I) to network traffic-based (Campaign
II and onward). This provided two benefits. (1) Fault injection on the com-
ponents with the highest throughput traffic ensures that such faults will cause
the most impact on the system. (2) This traffic-based selection method led
to further development of HPCArrow’s capabilities to allow for user-specified
target components. This in turn created a better mechanism for reproducible
experiments as we can now rerun the exact same scenarios repeatedly. Unlike
in Campaign I, where each “repeated” experiment can still vary randomly
in the targeted application and exact component, in Campaign II, each in-
jection is exactly repeated five times, down to the targeted application and
component.
The second reason is the need for a more direct comparison between sys-
tems with Gemini and Aries interconnects as part of future work of this
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project. Maintaining as many parameters (e.g. applications, methodology,
etc.) constant across systems is necessary for comparing resiliency of Gem-
ini versus Aries interconnects. This necessity for comparison as well as for
applications that generate high traffic on the HSN led to the construction of
Application Set II. Applications from this set are ones that we could compile,
scale, and run on both the Gemini and Aries testbeds given to us by NCSA
and SNL, respectively.
4.3.1 Summary Results
There was a total of 157 experiments on JYC. Out of 157, 30 were baseline
runs without injections. The remaining 127 were injection experiments: 52
link injections, 38 connection injections, and 37 blade injections.
Table 4.7 and its corresponding plot in Figure 4.11 summarize these exper-
iments and results. Once again, they show only the application run statuses
as a result of direct injections. The general observation that indirect injec-
tions have negligible impact on applications remained mostly true, except
for a few cases of indirect injections causing unusual behavior. However,
there is reason to believe that other factors led to these unique cases, such
as secondary failures that occurred naturally in the system. Therefore, their
statistics are left out of the summary table (see Appendix G for the full table
summary), but we still discuss these cases in a separate section below. Addi-
tionally, all failovers and warm swaps executed in response to fault injections
completed successfully. There is one case in which a warm swap on a blade
failed, which is also discussed below.
4.3.2 Failure Scenarios
As in Campaign I, Figure 4.11 also shows that a direct blade injection always
caused the targeted application to fail. What also stands out is that any
connection injection on Charm++ applications (AMR, Kripke, LeanMD, and
NAMD) always caused either a crash or hang scenario. MPI applications
(MILC and PSDNS) appear to be the most resilient of the bunch, with a
few exceptions for MILC, which experienced crashes due to link injections.
We discuss several interesting cases and examine resiliency behaviors at the
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Figure 4.11: Summary percentages of Campaign II’s direct injections and
application run statuses, grouped by fault type and benchmark. Refer to
Table 4.7 for counts.
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Table 4.7: Summary of Campaign II, showing the outcomes (Crash, Hang,
No Impact) of applications that are directly injected with various fault
types (Blade, Connection, Link). See Appendix G for the full summary,
including indirect faults.
Benchmark Application Fault Type
Run Status #(%)




Blade 5 (100.0) 0 0
Connection 6 (60.0) 4 (40.0) 0
Link 3 (75.0) 1 (25.0) 0
Kripke
Blade 5 (100.0) 0 0
Connection 5 (83.33) 1 (16.67) 0
Link 0 2 (25.0) 6 (75.0)
LeanMD
Blade 5 (100.0) 0 0
Connection 3 (60.0) 2 (40.0) 0




Blade 5 (100.0) 0 0
Connection 1 (20.0) 4 (80.0) 0
Link 1 (9.09) 10 (90.91) 0
MPI
MILC
Blade 5 (100.0) 0 0
Connection 0 0 7 (100.0)
Link 4 (36.36) 0 7 (63.64)
PSDNS
Blade 12 (100.0) 0 0
Connection 0 0 4 (100.0)
Link 0 0 10 (100.0)
application, network, and system levels.
MPI: Crashes
While MPI applications AWP-ODC from Campaign I and PSDNS from Cam-
paign II both showed strong fault tolerance against link and connection fail-
ures, the MILC application was the only MPI application to show suscep-
tibility to link failures. It was expected for MILC to resume once failover
unquiesces and finishes, but it instead crashed over one third of the time for




Figure 4.12: Timeline of Experiment 67 with a single link injection.
A rough stack trace produced by Abnormal Termination Processing (ATP),
a Cray debugging utility, revealed the application was in the middle of an
Allreduce function, preparing reduced results to distribute to all processes.
A wait function was invoked to wait for completion of an RMA request and
then a test function to test for request completion. It is this test function
that failed. Without the source code of the the system messaging layer, it
is unclear what the assertion was looking for. We can only speculate that
ultimately, an RMA request could not be completed due to the link failure
and this caused MILC to trip over this assertion and die.
We present Experiment 67 where a 16-node MILC application was targeted
by failing link c0-0c1s1g0l00. Figures 4.12 and 4.13 illustrate the timeline of
events at the experiment level and at the network level, respectively. We
observe traffic patterns similar to those of crashes in 4.13a, where at t =
274.92, the link fault was injected, at t = 312, failover completed, and at
t = 526.414, warm swap completed. The combined network recovery and
hardware error logs report is shown in Table 4.8 with nothing out of the
ordinary.
Charm++: Hangs vs. Crashes
Campaign I had produced scenarios in which Charm++ applications were
observed to hang and make no forward progress following a link or connection
fault, despite the scheduler reporting the job as “running.” Campaign II
69
(a) Cumulative traffic plot of Experiment 67 with a single link injection targeting
a 16-node MILC application.
(b) Traffic plot of a 16-node MILC application run in Experiment 67, with focus
on a Gemini (two nodes shown) whose link was targeted for injection.
Figure 4.13: Traffic plots of Experiment 67 with a single link injection.
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Table 4.8: Summary of system logs for Experiment 67 (single link fault).
Event Count
Link Failed 2






Warm Swap Successful 1
SSID Request Timeout 4
NW Exchange from SUPR to RUN 5
NW Link Went Inactive 2
Sender Packet Timeout 6
Receiver EOP Bad 3
Receiver CC1 Bad 3
Receiver PIC Error 3
reproduced and corroborated these observations with repeated experiments.
In some hang cases for NAMD, such as in Experiment 220, NAMD did not
output any error messages. In other cases, it continuously wrote the following
warning to its logs until NAMD was terminated by ALPS for hitting the
Walltime:
Warning: GNI_PostRdma: ioctl(GNI_IOC_POST_RDMA) returned error -
Invalid argument at line 161 in file rdma_transfer.c
The Charm++ runtime framework logs this warning when an invalid ar-
gument is encountered in a RDMA transaction. However, since this was
a warning and did not trigger any abnormal terminations in the way that
crashes do, the ATP utility did not provide any stack traces. In the one
NAMD crash scenario due to a connection fault, the ATP reported a similar
error: [498] registerFromMempool; err=GNI RC INVALID PARAM.
NAMD traffic as shown in Figure 4.14 died after the link injection (c0-
0c1s0g1l01) at t = 342.004 and never resumed following failover completion
at t = 380 or warm swap completion at t = 603.834. This pattern mirrored
that of crashes. The traffic plots show up to 7200 seconds (two hours) to
highlight that the reported running time of NAMD was two hours, as depicted
in Figure 4.15, yet there was no traffic over the network for the majority of
this time. Hardware error logs are similar to previously discussed examples.
For completion, it is still provided in Table 4.9.
During hangs and crashes, Kripke also sometimes reported the same exact
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(a) Cumulative traffic plot of Experiment 220 with a single link injection
targeting a 16-node NAMD application.
(b) Traffic plot of a 16-node NAMD application run in Experiment 220, with
focus on a Gemini (two nodes shown) whose link was targeted for injection.
Figure 4.14: Traffic plots of Experiment 220 with a single link injection.
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Figure 4.15: Timeline of Experiment 220 with a single link injection.
Table 4.9: Summary of system logs for Experiment 220 (single link fault).
Event Count
Link Failed 2






Warm Swap Successful 1
ORB RAM Scrubbed Lower Entry 3
ORB RAM Scrubbed Upper Entry 3
SSID Request Timeout 37
NW Exchange from SUPR to RUN 1
NW Link Went Inactive 2
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warning as hung NAMD applications. In one scenario, Kripke crashed due a
segmentation fault during a memory copy invoked from the Charm++ PUP
(Pack/UnPack) library, which is used to pack an array, structure, or object
into a memory buffer.
PUP::fromMem::bytes(void*, unsigned long, unsigned long, PUP::
dataType)@pup_util.C:165
__cray_memcpy_INT@0x2042d315
ATP Stack walkback for Rank 74 done
Process died with signal 11: ’Segmentation fault’
LeanMD hang instances behaved similarly to NAMD hangs in terms of
GNI PostRdma warning messages and incomplete computational step out-
puts. None of the crashes due to connection faults produced a stack trace to
analyze.
AMR (HugePages) hangs produced no output. However, its crash messages
varied wildly, such as the memory copy segmentation fault seen for Kripke.
AMR also tripped over an assertion as shown below:
Reason: Assertion "msg_nbytes > 0" failed in file machine.c line
2239.
aborting job:
This assertion failure was due to a SMSG send failure, meaning a network
packet had been dropped in-flight to its destination Gemini. AMR (SMP)
crash instances all reported this same error as well.
Across all of our analysis methodologies, there was no indicator to differ-
entiate between a hang or a crash scenario. The only telltale sign that an
application had hung was that the ALPS continued to report the application
as “running” while no further computations were logged in the application’s
outputs. Eventually when the maximum allowed time had elapsed, the ALPS
terminated the job. This creates an interesting detection problem in that
from the system side, there is no obvious indication of a hung application.
Indirect Injections
Campaign II is the only campaign with failure scenarios in which an appli-
cation failed even though it was not a direct target of an injection. The only
application to exhibit this behavior was PSDNS.
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We present Experiment 85, which used the set of applications and place-
ments from the Sparse Configuration. In this experiment, a link injection on
c0-0c2s0g1l42 directly targeted a four-node AMR application in the top chas-
sis. While AMR crashed as result, a four-node PSDNS application placed in
a different chassis, the middle one, also crashed before completing its com-
putations. The error reported in its logs is simply:
lib-4205 : UNRECOVERABLE library error
The program was unable to request more memory space.
This error message indicated that during one of PSDNS computational
steps, it tried to allocate memory, but was evidently unable to request more.
Sometimes this might indicate that the application’s problem size is too
large to be handled by four nodes. However, this application had been run
close to 100 times throughout this campaign, including ten baseline runs and
four direct injection runs, without premature terminations. Only five such
instances of UNRECOVERABLE library error occurred and none were caused
by direct injections. So this error was unlikely solely due to the problem size
itself.
Since this was an indirect injection, we present only PSDNS’s traffic plot
as shown in Figure 4.16 and its system report in Table 4.10. While PSDNS
may appear to complete within the expected time window of 30-40 minutes,
it does indeed crash at around t = 2087 according to the ATP stack trace
and PSDNS’s log outputs. However, the experiment timeline as shown in
Figure 4.17 reports the time of link injection at t = 290.049, the time of
failover completion at t = 329, and the time of warm swap completion at
t = 544.498. All of these events are far removed in time from the time of
PSDNS’s crash. Similarly, in the other four instances of PSDNS crashing, the
application crashed very early in its run (about 80-90 seconds) with the same
UNRECOVERABLE library error, even before a fault injection had occurred.
These four instances were repeated in back-to-back runs of the same link
injection experiment in the same night.
It may be possible that the link injections had no causal impact that led
to PSDNS’s crashes and that there may be some other underlying issue that
was not reported to the system. It may also be possible that memory was not
properly freed, causing memory across four nodes to run out; it is unclear at
this point what might lead to such behavior. Future work should investigate
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Table 4.10: Summary of system logs for Experiment 85 (single link fault).
Event Count
Link Failed 2






Warm Swap Successful 1
ORB RAM Scrubbed Lower Entry 7
ORB RAM Scrubbed Upper Entry 7
SSID Request Timeout 297
NW Exchange from SUPR to RUN 1
NW Link Went Inactive 2
collecting data on memory utilization, similar to traffic data for the network.
We should also develop a fault model for memory congestion at the node
level.
Warm Swap Failure
Lastly, we present a case in which a warm swap restoration for a blade
injection failed to bring a blade back into service. Running applications
from the Medium Configuration, Experiment 160 injected a blade fault on
blade c0-0c2s5 at t = 276.492, targeting an eight-node Kripke application.
At t = 319, the failover completed and at t = 858, the warm swap process
terminated with a failure.
From our own injector’s logs, the following is reported for the blade warm
swap commands:
ERROR: xtbounce command to initialize links timed out
ERROR: Timeout during xtbounce link initialization
FAILURE: Warm swap command failed.
The warm swap add command had failed due to an xtbounce that was
meant to initialize the links on the blade that was being added back into
service. The xtbounce timed out instead, causing the whole process to fail.
A variant xtbounce command had to be called manually on the SMW by the
system administrator in order to successfully warm swap the blade back into
service.
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Figure 4.16: Traffic plot of a four-node PSDNS application run in
Experiment 85 that was not a target of the single link injection.
77
Figure 4.17: Timeline of Experiment 85 with a single link injection.
It is likely another error had interfered with the xtbounce underneath
the hood. While it was the warm swap process that was disrupted in this
experiment, this particular case reflects the spirit of Campaign IV and its
goal to disrupt the failover process with injections during recovery.
Application Run Times
In this last section of Campaign II, we present one final result in Figure 4.18.
In the presence of fault injections, applications were observed to have statis-
tically significant increased run times on average compared to applications
that ran without any fault injections in the system. This holds true across
all applications, despite the crash cases observed. This result demonstrates
the performance impact of even a single fault on the system and how critical
fault detection and fault tolerance is in HPC systems.
4.4 Fault Injection Campaign III
In this campaign, experiments maintain single fault injections, still using ap-
plications from Set II. However, the main difference is varying the time at
which faults are injected. All applications have about a 30 minute window.
Campaigns I and II only focused on injecting in the first 10 minutes of an
application’s running time. Campaign III injects during the middle 10 min-
utes and the last 10 minutes. With regard to results, there is nothing new
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Figure 4.18: Distributions of application run times in Campaign II,
comparing applications that ran in the presence of fault injections versus
those that ran in a fault-free system.
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Table 4.11: Full summary of Campaign III, showing the outcomes of
applications that in the presence of (direct and indirect) faults.
Benchmark Application Fault Type
Run Status #(%)
Crash Hang No Impact
Charm++
(HugePages)
AMR Connection 8 (80.0) 2 (20.0) 0
Kripke Connection 0 0 10 (100.0)
Link 0 0 10 (100.0)
LeanMD Blade 0 0 10 (100.0)
Connection 0 0 10 (100.0)
Link 0 0 10 (100.0)
Charm++
(SMP)
NAMD Connection 0 0 10 (100.0)
Link 2 (20.0) 8 (80.0) 0
MPI
MILC Blade 10 (100.0) 0 0
Connection 0 0 10 (100.0)
PSDNS Blade 0 0 10 (100.0)
Connection 0 0 10 (100.0)
Link 0 0 10 (100.0)
uncovered by varying the fault injection delay that has not already been cov-
ered in the previous sections. Thus this section only presents the summary
results.
4.4.1 Summary Results
There was a total of 30 experiments on JYC: 10 link injections, 10 connection
injections, and 10 blade injections. The link injections targeted the 16-node
NAMD application from the Medium Configuration; the connection injec-
tions targeted the four-node AMR application from the Sparse Configura-
tion; and finally, the blade injections targeted the 16-node MILC application
from the Dense Configuration. Table 4.11 and Figure 4.19 show the full
summary of these experiments. Half of the experiments were injected with
a 600 second delay while the other half were injected with a 1200 second
delay. Figures 4.20a and 4.20b illustrate the timelines of a 600 second delay
single blade injection experiment and a 1200 second delay link injection ex-
periment, respectively. Experiment 241 targets a 16-node MILC application
while Experiment 240 targets a 16-node NAMD application.
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Figure 4.19: Summary percentages of Campaign III’s injections (direct and
indirect) and application run statuses, grouped by fault type and
benchmark. Refer to Table 4.11 for counts.
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(a) Timeline of Experiment 241 with a 600 second delayed blade injection.
(b) Timeline of Experiment 240 with a 1200 second delayed link injection.
Figure 4.20: Timeline plots of Campaign III experiments.
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4.5 Fault Injection Campaign IV
Campaign IV’s focus shifted away from assessment of application fault tol-
erance to evaluation of system resiliency. One of the main mechanisms for
fault tolerance on HPC systems is its failover recovery procedures, which
attempts to mitigate any ramifications of faults or failures and to minimize
any disruptions of service. To evaluate failovers, multiple fault injections are
required: one fault to trigger a failover and at least one other fault to inject
during failover. The warm swap procedure is not targeted in this work, al-
though the injection methodology developed here would work the same for
injections during warm swap.
The main challenge in this campaign is the tight time window of the failover
recovery process due to JYC being a small-scale system. Failover on JYC
only lasts for 30 seconds in total while containing about 16 main stages with
nine minor stages. This time window varies from system to system, de-
pending upon the scale of the system: the larger the system, the longer the
recovery window. For example, on Blue Waters and other large-scale pro-
duction systems, this can last over 600 seconds [15]. A secondary challenge
in this campaign is determining when to inject the second fault. In an ideal
case, having the the ability to select any stage of recovery and promptly in-
ject a fault requires real time monitoring of failovers. Network related events
and errors are captured by the xtnlrd daemon and reported in the nlrd logs,
which are stored on the SMW and rotated daily. We take advantage of the
fact that once we inject the first fault, there is always a failover that im-
mediately triggers in response. As soon as the injector triggers a fault, it
begins to monitor the most current nlrd log based on date and check for the
appropriate output line corresponding to the target stage. Once it detects
the stage, it then injects the second fault.
In this section, we present the results of our injection during recovery
experiments and illustrate the challenges of injecting on a small-scale system
like JYC.
4.5.1 Summary Results
First, we present the summary results of initial injection during recovery ex-
periments in order to determine the feasibility of these experiments on JYC.
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In total, 71 injection during recovery experiments were performed and sum-
marized in in Table 4.12. Four injection during recovery experiments are not
counted in Table 4.12 because they involved multiple faults during recovery
whereas Table 4.12 only shows experiments involving a single fault during
recovery. The bulk of the direct injections shown in Table 4.12 involved
combinations of link, connection, and blade injections. There are no indirect
injections that led to any unusual behaviors and all failovers and warm swaps
completed without issue.
The target recovery stages included Alive, Route Compute, Route Install,
and Switch Netwatch. These were initially chosen due to the critical nature
of each stage and due to scenarios observed in field data. Route Compute
involves computing and rerouting around the current faults in the HSN.
If this computation is based on an incorrect state of the HSN, then many
packets will likely be incorrectly routed. Route Install and Switch Netwatch
are similarly critical in that introducing a new fault during these stages will
make the installed routes incorrect and obsolete. Lastly, the Alive stage
checks which components are alive. Injecting during this stage may corrupt
the alive statuses. In short, the goal is to confuse and corrupt the system’s
view of the network.
We first ran these experiments without information on recovery stage du-
rations and delays, all of which affect the time to recovery stage detection
and the time to fault injection. Post-experiment analysis revealed that based
on durations and time to detection and injection, certain stages are better
candidates to target than others. The next several sections discuss this anal-
ysis and present case scenarios on failover behaviors as well as late injections,
which we call injection misses.
4.5.2 Duration of Recovery Stages
Using the data collected from Campaign II, which provided 127 data points
of completed failover procedures, we measure the windows of time for each
recovery stage. These durations are captured and calculated from lines in
nlrd logs that announce the current recovery stage. For example:
1 2018-10-25T19:18:56.006931-05:00 SMWTDS 31595 2018-10-25 19:18:55
SMWTDS 31597 ***** dispatch: current_state quiesce *****
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Table 4.12: Summary of Campaign IV, showing the outcomes of






1st Fault 2nd Fault Crash Hang No Impact
LeanMD Blade Link route compute 1 (100.0) 0 0
MILC Connection Blade alive 0 0 1 (100.0)
down unused links 0 0 1 (100.0)
route compute 0 0 1 (100.0)
route install 0 0 1 (100.0)
switch netwatch 0 0 1 (100.0)
Link Blade alive 0 0 1 (100.0)
down unused links 1 (50.0) 0 1 (50.0)
route compute 1 (100.0) 0 0
route install 0 0 1 (100.0)
switch netwatch 0 0 1 (100.0)
Connection Connection alive 0 0 1 (100.0)
route compute 0 0 1 (100.0)
route install 0 0 1 (100.0)
switch netwatch 0 0 1 (100.0)
Link Connection alive 1 (50.0) 0 1 (50.0)
route compute 2 (100.0) 0 0
route install 1 (100.0) 0 0
switch netwatch 2 (100.0) 0 0
Connection Link alive 0 0 1 (100.0)
route compute 0 0 2 (100.0)
route install 0 0 1 (100.0)
switch netwatch 0 0 1 (100.0)
Link Link route compute 1 (100.0) 0 0
route install 1 (100.0) 0 0
switch netwatch 1 (100.0) 0 0
NAMD Connection Connection alive 0 1 (100.0) 0
route compute 0 2 (100.0) 0
route install 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0) 0
switch netwatch 0 2 (100.0) 0
Link Connection alive 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0) 0
route compute 0 2 (100.0) 0
route install 0 3 (100.0) 0
switch netwatch 0 2 (100.0) 0
Blade Link route compute 0 1 (100.0) 0
Connection Link route compute 0 1 (100.0) 0
route install 0 1 (100.0) 0
switch netwatch 0 2 (100.0) 0
Link Link alive 0 2 (100.0) 0
down drain 0 1 (100.0) 0
route compute 0 3 (100.0) 0
route install 0 3 (100.0) 0
switch netwatch 0 2 (100.0) 0
PSDNS Connection Blade alive 1 (100.0) 0 0
down unused links 1 (100.0) 0 0
route compute 1 (100.0) 0 0
route install 1 (100.0) 0 0
switch netwatch 1 (100.0) 0 0
Link Blade alive 1 (100.0) 0 0
down unused links 2 (100.0) 0 0
route compute 1 (100.0) 0 0
route install 1 (100.0) 0 0
switch netwatch 1 (100.0) 0 0
Link Link route install 0 0 1 (100.0)
switch netwatch 0 0 1 (100.0)
85
2 2018-10-25T19:18:57.007881-05:00 SMWTDS 31595 2018-10-25 19:18:56
SMWTDS 31597 ***** dispatch: current_state quiesce_drain *****
To calculate the duration of a stage, we take the difference of the first
timestamps between two log lines. For example, in the log snippet shown
above, the duration of the Quiesce stage would be calculated by taking the
first timestamp of line 1 and subtracting it from the first timestamp of line
2. Note that there is a second timestamp in the same log lines, which will be
discussed in detail later. Here, since we only care about the relative difference
and the first time stamp has more precision (microseconds), we use the first
timestamp.
Figure 4.21 shows the distribution of durations for the 15 main stages.
Each fault type is represented by its own separate graph. The final 16th stage,
Initial, is left out as this is the system’s natural, fault-free state. Injecting
during the Initial stage would be outside the failover recovery period. The
main differences across the fault types are the distributions of the Alive
stage, which has a larger variation for blades; the Switch Netwatch stage,
which has a larger variation for connections; and the Route Install stage,
which has practically no variation for connections as compared to the other
fault types. The main takeaway across all distributions is that the vast
majority of stages are less than three seconds (note that the boxplots are
displayed in milliseconds), which does not leave much room for detection
and reaction. Certain stages are inherently impossible to inject on due to the
short duration, such as Switch Netwatch with a median of 103 microseconds
or Set Alerts with a median of 508 microseconds.
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(a) Distributions of recovery stage durations. These were captured during single
link fault failovers.
(b) Distributions of recovery stage durations. These were captured during single
connection fault failovers.
Figure 4.21: Distributions of recovery stage durations for each fault type.
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(c) Distributions of recovery stage durations. These were captured during single
blade fault failovers.
Figure 4.21: Continued.
4.5.3 Latency of Injection During Recovery
Given that the windows of recovery stages are brief, verifying how quickly
the injector can detect the target recovery stage and react in time to inject
is necessary for assessing the injector’s capabilities. There are several delays
that contribute to this latency between the start of the recovery stage and the
injection of the second fault as shown in Figure 4.22. These delays include
the time W that it takes for the nlrd daemon to generate and write the target
stage’s log message, the time D that it takes for the injector to detect the
target stage via the nlrd logs, and the time I that it takes for the injector
to react and inject the second fault. If the average time to detection plus
the average time to injection is beyond the third quartile of a recovery stage
duration distribution, then it is highly unlikely to have a successful injection




























Figure 4.22: Delays that contribute to the latency between occurrence of a
target recovery stage and a fault injection.
Delay Between Stage and Log Message
To select a specific stage to target, we require real-time monitoring of all
failover procedures. As previously mentioned, network events are stored
in the nlrd logs. These logs are the only source of information about the
system’s network recovery stages that the injector toolkit may access. An
example output from an nlrd log is provided as follows:
2018-10-25T19:19:20.026178-05:00 SMWTDS 31595 2018-10-25 19:19:19
SMWTDS 31597 ***** dispatch: current_state finish *****
2018-10-25T19:19:20.026188-05:00 SMWTDS 31595 2018-10-25 19:19:19
SMWTDS 31597 do_finish: Re-enabling throttle daemon...
2018-10-25T19:19:20.026203-05:00 SMWTDS 31595 2018-10-25 19:19:19
SMWTDS 31597 INFO: 24 out of 24 L0s are alive
Nlrd logs are the only system logs we examine in this work that have two
timestamps in a single log line. There is a chain of generating and forwarding
of messages that is dictated by the rsyslog, which contains forwarding rules
on the SMW that place incoming messages into their final corresponding log
files. Messages that are sent to rsyslog are then forwarded and included in
its entirety, including the original message’s header (e.g. timestamp), as the
message body in a new message with a new timestamp. Thus the first, outer
timestamp is an artifact of rsyslog while the second, inner timestamp is closer
to the event. The challenge that arises here is that the precision of the inner
timestamp is at the level of seconds while the outer timestamp’s precision
is at the level of microseconds. In the log outputs shown above, the event
happened approximately at 19:19:19 (hour:minute:second) while the message
was placed in its final log location at around 19:19:20.
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Figure 4.23: Distribution of the delay between recovery stage occurrence
and its corresponding log message written to the nlrd log. This is an upper
bound estimation. See Appendix H for the summary statistics.
It is difficult to precisely measure the delay caused by this phenomenon,
from the occurrence of the event itself, to the event’s log message being gen-
erated, and finally to the event’s log message being forwarded and placed into
the final SMW location. To give an upper limit on this delay, we examined
over 7000 lines from nlrd logs collected during Campaign II, selecting lines
that only report the current state as shown in the example nlrd log mes-
sages and calculating the difference between the two reported timestamps.
We assume the second, inner timestamp is at zero microseconds and that it
is the time of the actual event occurrence. There is no means to measure
the delay between the actual event occurrence to its originally generated log
message. This upper limit distribution is shown in Figure 4.23.
On average, it takes about one second from the event’s original log message
to it being forwarded and written into its final destination. This, however,
can take as long as almost two seconds! Most recovery stages are sub-three
seconds, which leaves little time for the injector itself to react.
Delay Between Stage Detection and Fault Injection
To detect the target stage, the stage during which we intend to inject a fault,
we implemented a simple log watcher in Python, similar to performing the
tail -F *.log UNIX command. To avoid any unnecessary overhead, we
do not spawn a new thread or process for the watcher. The watcher routine
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(a) Distributions of time from the
event’s original log message to the
target stage being detected by the
injector. See Appendix H for the
summary statistics.
(b) Distributions of time from the
target stage being detected to the
second fault injection. See Appendix H
for the summary statistics.
Figure 4.24: Distributions of time to detection and time to injection.
starts immediately after the first fault is injected and reads lines out of the
nlrd log as they are being written. If a target stage is detected, then the in-
jector immediately sends the appropriate fault command, which is prepared
even before the first fault is initiated to reduce overhead. If a target stage is
never reached, the watcher “times out” after a certain number of iterations
while reading the log file. This number of iterations is precomputed before-
hand in order to reduce the overheads of using any timeout functionalities or
any library that relies on the system time.
Certain latencies, however, cannot be completely avoided as the watcher
still must spend time to check every line for the proper substring, the injec-
tor’s logger must log the time it detected the target stage, and the injector
itself must send the fault command to the system. The injector’s logger does
not log when the command is sent (to avoid unnecessary overhead), but it
does record it once the command returns with a status.
We provide another upper bound on the time from the event’s original
log message to the target stage being detected by the injector and the time
from target stage detection to the second fault injection in Figures 4.24a and
4.24b, respectively.
Time to Detection. In Figure 4.24a, the reactions to both fault types
examined (link and connection) on average take around 1.43 seconds, but
can take over 2.7 seconds at worst. Note that the second, inner timestamp
was used to calculate the time to detection. The watcher itself is reasonably
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fast, about a couple milliseconds on average, in detecting when the final log
message is written to the nlrd log.
Time to Injection. In Figure 4.24b, note the stark contrast between
injecting a link fault, which on average takes a couple hundred milliseconds,
versus a connection fault, which on average takes about 1.4 seconds. This is
due to the fact that for connection faults, multiple commands must be sent to
fail all the links in a torus connection direction (four for the Y+/Y- directions
or eight for the Z+/Z- directions). For link faults (and blade faults), only
one command is sent.
Based on these analyses, it becomes evident that in addition to recovery
stages that are inherently impossible to inject on, there are also stages with
durations that are still too short to accommodate the time to detection and
time to injection. Since time to detection takes about 1.4 seconds and time
to inject a connection fault takes about another 1.4 seconds, there are few
stages for a connection injection to succeed in terms of being timely. It will
likely only succeed for Down Unused Links, Down Drain, Alive2, and Quiesce
Drain stages. This limits possible injections into critical stages to link and
blade injections.
4.5.4 Recovery Behavior and Resiliency to Faults
In this section, we review case experiments to highlight the resiliency behav-
iors of failover in the presence of multiple faults as well as to illustrate once
more the challenge of the small window of recovery on small-scale HPC sys-
tems such as JYC. Each case is presented with an experiment timeline of the
applications, injections, failover recoveries, and warm swap restorations. An
entire experimental timeline ends when the system is restored to a fault-less
state and all applications terminate, which typically happens at about 30-40
minutes of run time. Each case is also presented with a more fine-grained
time scale graph, focusing in on each experiment’s failover recovery timeline
and depicting when the two faults are injected, the timings and durations
of recovery stages, and the overall failover behavior. The warm swap stages
are left out of these recovery timeline graphs as they are not the targets of
injections in this campaign.
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Double Failovers: Fail and Restart
In experiment 251, two link faults were injected into the system, with the
second during the crucial Route Compute stage. The experiment timeline of
the injection, recovery, and warm swap events is shown in Figure 4.25. Note
that only one warm swap may be invoked at any given time on the system.
In this scenario, after the second link fault was successfully injected during
the proper stage, the failover recognized the fault immediately, prematurely
terminated the current failover, and restarted the failover process. This be-
havior is shown in Figure 4.26 when the failover jumped to the Finish stage
after the Check Route Compute stage. The nlrd logs showed the following
messages:
2018-10-25T19:18:39.982166-05:00 SMWTDS 31595 2018-10-25 19:18:39
SMWTDS 31597 ***ERROR***: Link recovery operation failed; error
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2018-10-25T19:18:39.982181-05:00 SMWTDS 31595 2018-10-25 19:18:39
SMWTDS 31597 Error string was: Link resiliency operation aborted
due to hardware failure during route computation
This disproves our previous speculation that if we disturb the route com-
putations, then the system would find itself installing invalid routes and thus
be in an invalid state. However, it seems that the system can recognize
a failed or corrupted Route Computation stage and is able to restart the
failover without further issue. This fail and restart behavior is only observed
for the Route Compute stage.
Double Failovers: Back-to-Back
In experiment 270, two link faults were injected into the system, with the
second during the Down Unused Links stage, which is the stage with the
longest duration. The experiment timeline is shown in Figure 4.27. In this
scenario, the first failover completed successfully and the second failover im-
mediately followed, skipping over the Initial stage that normally is present in
a completed failover. The system was able to recognize that a separate fault
occurred during the Down Unused Links stage and initiated a second failover
to handle the second fault immediately after the first failover completed. In-
jecting during many of the recovery stages, such as Route Install, Quiesce
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Figure 4.25: Timeline of Experiment 251 with two link injections, depicting
when they are injected, when their failover procedures begin and complete,
and when the warm swap restorations begin and complete.
Drain, or Down Drain, produces these back-to-back failovers response as
shown in Figure 4.28. In other words, this is the most common observed
response to injections during recovery.
Single Failover
In experiment 253, two link faults were injected into the system, with the
second during the Alive stage, a stage in the early pre-quiescence period
of the recovery timeline. The experiment timeline is shown in Figure 4.29.
Note that there is only one failover process. In this experiment, after the
link fault was successfully injected during the proper stage, the fault was
recognized immediately and was added to the list of failed components. The
failover process continues as usual and does not require a second failover.
This behavior is shown in the experiment’s recovery timeline in Figure 4.30.
While the Alive stage may be checking for the status of blades, there is
still a background mechanism in the xtnlrd daemon to detect future faults.
Additionally, this case demonstrates that the failover does not need to restart
since the recovery process is still in its earlier stages. At this point, the
failover has not yet used the old list of failed components to compute new
routes. Injecting during the Alive2 stage also produces the same failover
behavior.
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Figure 4.26: Breakdown of Experiment 251’s fail and restart recovery
timeline, depicting two link injections, with the second during the Route
Compute stage. Faults are highlighted in red and stages are highlighted in
blue (first failover) and green (second failover).
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Figure 4.27: Timeline of Experiment 270 with two link injections, depicting
when they are injected, when their failover procedures begin and complete,
and when the warm swap restorations begin and complete.
Injection Misses
Experiment 276 is presented in this section to illustrate an injection miss,
which is a scenario in which the injector fails to inject during the proper
target stage. There are no detrimental effects on the system of an injection
miss. Either the fault is caught by a subsequent recovery stage or it becomes
a second fault after the initial recovery completes. In the latter scenario, a
new failover starts in response to the second fault.
Experiment 276 involved an initial connection fault and a second link fault,
targeting the Switch Network stage. In this scenario, the injector failed to
inject during the Switch Netwatch stage and instead injected during the
subsequent Down Unused Links stage as shown in Figure 4.31. Switch Net-
watch is one of the near impossible stages to inject during because of its
microsecond-level durations. Like in Experiment 270, the first failover pro-
cess completed successfully, but instead of returning to the Initial stage, the
second failover commenced to handle the second link fault. All injections
intended for Switch Netwatch ended up being caught in the Down Unused
Links stage, which typically lasts over 10 seconds.
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Figure 4.28: Breakdown of Experiment 270’s double failover recovery
timeline, depicting two link injections, with the second during the Down
Unused Links stage. Faults are highlighted in red and stages are
highlighted in blue (first failover) and green (second failover).
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Figure 4.29: Timeline of Experiment 253 with two link faults, depicting
when they are injected, when their failover procedures begin and complete,
and when the warm swap restorations begin and complete.
Multiple Injections During Recovery
To further demonstrate HPCArrow’s capabilities to inject multiple faults,
we conducted four experiments involving multiple faults injected during a
single failover and during a series of failed failovers (all but the last failover
procedure fails). For these experiments, we run the Dense Configuration with
faults targeting PSDNS and MILC applications.
Injections into the same recovery stage. In one experiment, we tar-
geted the Alive stage with eight link faults during the same recovery stage of
a single recovery procedure. A second experiment injected four connection
faults. Ultimately, all failovers succeeded and recovery behavior matched
what we observed with only a single injection during recovery.
Injections into recovery procedure initiated in response to fail-
ure of proceeding failover. For two experiments, we targeted the Route
Compute stage because it is the only stage, as previously shown, that is
immediately terminated by the system upon detection of additional faults
and automatically restarted as a new failover. Instead of injecting multiple
faults all at once, we injected one link fault for each Route Compute stage
of a restarted failover (in response to the proceeding failed failover). One
experiment involved a total of 16 link faults (the other experiment involved
eight faults), each fault injected during the Route Compute stage and caus-
ing the current failover to terminate and restart. In total, 15 failovers were
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Figure 4.30: Breakdown of Experiment 253’s recovery timeline, depicting
two link faults, with the second during the Alive stage. Faults are
highlighted in red and stages are highlighted in blue (first failover).
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Figure 4.31: Breakdown of experiment 276’s recovery timeline, depicting
two link faults, with the second failing to inject in the Switch Netwatch
stage. Faults are highlighted in red and stages are highlighted in blue (first
failover) and green (second failover).
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Figure 4.32: Distributions of the recovery durations of single fault
experiments (Campaign II) versus multiple faults during recovery
experiments (Campaign IV). Refer to Appendix H for the summary
statistics.
terminated and restarted. The 16th and final failover ultimately succeeded
and the system did not suffer any permanent problems.
Increased Failover Recovery Time
By restarting the failover or by starting a second failover, the recovery time
of should inevitably increase. An increased time in failover recovery means
an increase in the probability of the occurrence of additional failures, which
may eventually lead to catastrophic failures in the system. According to [5],
if the recovery time exceeds 300 seconds, the probability of additional failures
raises to 0.8.
As shown in Figure 4.32, failovers that occurred during the single fault
injection experiments of Campaign II had recovery durations of about 39
seconds. Failovers that occurred during the injection during recovery experi-
ments of Campaign IV had recovery durations of about 76 seconds, which is
close to double the durations in Campaign II. There is a clear increase of re-




FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we summarize the results and observations of all four fault
injection campaigns. We provide discussions on these observations, suggest
future work in this space, and conclude this thesis.
5.1 HPCArrow
We developed a SWIFI toolkit called HPCArrow as a means of studying fault
tolerance and resiliency on HPC Cray systems by systematically executing
fault injections on network and compute components. The advantages of
this tool are its abilities to provide a controllable injection environment and
perform experiments that are automated and repeatable.
HPCArrow’s Fault Injector module can inject link, connection, node, and
blade faults by running on the SMW and issuing Cray commands. It per-
forms single or multiple injections at random or at user-specified locations
and times. In terms of multiple injections, all injections following the first
fault can be triggered either during recovery or after recovery. For injec-
tions during recovery, this module can monitor network events in real time
and conduct single or multiple injections during recovery, targeting a user-
specified recovery stage. The injector is also responsible for performing warm
swaps to return injected components back into service and restore the system
to a fault-less state.
The Workload Manager module can compile, pre-configure, and submit
applications to be launched on the system, all based on user-configurable
YAML files. Currently, HPCArrow supports Moab/TORQUE as the resource
and workload managers. It also supports Slurm [39] in preparation for fault
injections on Aries systems.
Should the tool be needed by users without root access on the SMW, the
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Injection Manager module allows remote triggering of injections, up to two
injections at this time. The Injection Manager is also responsible for launch-
ing the log transfer script that gathers all system, hardware, and injection
logs and transfers them to a location accessible to our user accounts.
HPCArrow’s capabilities are successfully demonstrated through four dif-
ferent types of fault injection campaigns on JYC. Our tool provides insight
into application-level resiliency, system-level recovery behaviors, and fault-
to-failure propagation paths. It has also been verified to work on several
Cray XC systems that use the Aries interconnect.
5.2 Application-Level Resiliency
Across four fault injection campaigns, we ran nine different applications,
covering various HPC programming frameworks. These include Charm++,
MPI, and PGAS. Throughout the course of this study, we observed various
behaviors at the application level in response to faults injected into the sys-
tem. The behavior common to all is the increase in application run time
during injection experiments as opposed to running on a normal, fault-free
system. The more failures, the longer the run time. In addition to hav-
ing increased run time, applications were also observed to crash or hang.
These unexpected behaviors highlight a fault tolerance deficiency among
these frameworks in that these applications cannot tolerate simple failures
of the network, even if recovery is successful. At the framework level, we
summarize their unique observations below.
5.2.1 Charm++
Of the three programming frameworks, Charm++ showed the most suscepti-
bility to faults, particularly to failures in communication paths and packets.
Across AMR, Kripke, LeanMD, and NAMD, we observed all of these appli-
cations experiencing crashes or hangs. By injecting a single connection fault,
we can guarantee failure, either a crash or hang, of any of these Charm++
applications. Even a single link failure can cause any of these applications,
aside from AMR (SMP), to hang quite frequently.
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5.2.2 MPI
Opposite of Charm++, MPI holds up as the most resilient programming
framework observed in this study. In terms of direct link or connection in-
jections, both AWP-ODC and PSDNS applications experienced no adverse
effects and were able to resume computational progress once the failover
rerouted around the injected faults. There were several instances of PSDNS
crashes due to running out of memory space across four nodes. The appli-
cation had been properly scaled and the errors occurred either long after or
some time before the fault injection, so it may be possible that the fault
injection was not responsible for directly causing the errors and crashes ex-
perienced by PSDNS. This phenomenon was also local in time, occurring
repeatedly only during one night of experiments.
MILC, however, was shown to crash only due to link injections with er-
ror messages indicating packet drops or problems processing the data in the
packet. Surprisingly, MILC does not display any adverse effects due to con-
nection injections, even though connection injections are the equivalent of
multiple and successive link faults.
5.2.3 PGAS
Lastly, the single PGAS application, UPC-FT, also showed susceptibility to
link and connection failures, often crashing in the presence of a single fault.
This, however, is expected as PGAS is known to be vulnerable to failures in
the network.
5.2.4 Discussion
Across all of these applications and frameworks, there are varying levels of
susceptibility to network-level failures and to disruptions in their communi-
cation paths. The common story behind these observed failures is packet
drops and loss of these transactions, which then cause applications to fail
their assertions, to experience segmentation faults, or to pass around invalid
arguments. In these crash scenarios, the onus falls partially on application
programmers to write more fault-tolerant programs. An example would be
retrying failed transactions for a short time before timing out. On the sys-
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tem side, if the network can be globally quiesced, then a global broadcast
that can tell all compute node threads to pause may be a viable option to
safeguard applications against network failures.
Application hangs are phenomena that were previously unobserved in
measurement-based analysis on production data. This hanging behavior is
unique to the Charm++ applications in our experiments. However, it is un-
clear what conditions can lead to a crash or hang. Application logs, traffic
data, and system logs show similar trends and outputs for crash and hang
behavior outcomes and offer no indicators to differentiate between the two.
The only indication of an application hang is that it is reported as “run-
ning” beyond its usual execution run time and eventually hits the two-hour
Walltime. In that time, no forward progress is made and the application’s
computations are left incomplete.
These indications, however, can only be detected through offline analysis
and diagnosis. Future work should investigate real-time detection of hanging
applications on the system side so that the system can either inform the user
or terminate the application itself. A hung application is a waste of system
resources, reducing system efficiency, and a waste of the unaware user’s time
and money. Other avenues of system information to detect application hangs
in real time will need to be explored, such as CPU usage during the hung
period. Additional information such as memory usage will also be helpful
in diagnosing the PSDNS crashes. Application writers should also consider
developing more fault-tolerant programs since programming frameworks like
MPI leave responsibility of fault tolerance to the programmers.
5.3 System-Level Resiliency
In additional to application-level resiliency, this work also endeavored to eval-
uate system-level resiliency and its responses to failures in the network and
compute hardware. Across all fault injection campaigns and nearly 300 fault
injection experiments, all failovers and warm swaps were reported to have
completed successfully. While Campaigns I-III provided some understanding
of failovers, injection during recovery experiments in Campaign IV were in-
tentionally designed to provide insight into failover behaviors, recreate failure
scenarios observed in other studies, and assess overall resiliency.
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In all 71 injection during recovery experiments, every failover recovery and
warm swap restoration completed successfully. Combinations of link, con-
nection, and blade injections were attempted across various stages, including
Route Compute, Route Install, Alive, Switch Netwatch, Down Unused Links,
and several more unintended stages due to injection misses. These injection
misses were experiments that failed to inject during the proper target stage.
These unintended stages included Alive2, Quiesce Drain, Check Route In-
stall, and Down Unused Links.
Based on results, the system’s failover process is quite robust, having mech-
anisms to cancel or fail the currently running failover and restart a new one,
such as shown in the Route Compute injections. The failover can also defer
the handling of the second fault until after the first failover completes, as
shown in most other stage injections. For injections during earlier stages,
such as Alive or Alive2, the currently running failover can handle the second
failure without needing to start a second failover process as new routes have
yet to be computed. These observations point to the likelihood that even in
the presence of more than two faults, the failover process will still behave
similarly and encounter no further issue on JYC. Additionally, by restarting
the failover or starting a second failover, the recovery time does inevitably
increase. An increased time in failover recovery means an increase in the
probability of the occurrence of additional failures, which may lead to catas-
trophic failures in the system. According to [5], if the recovery time exceeds
300 seconds, the probability of additional failures raises to 0.8.
The mentioned injection misses were predominantly due to connection in-
jections, due to the brief durations of many recovery stages and the nature
of having multiple commands to send, which causes a delay in the time to
injection. The small time window of recovery stages, which is a property
of a small-scale system, coupled with the latency of the injector to detect
target recovery stages and to inject the second fault makes this campaign
highly challenging. We suspect that these are the main culprits for why we
cannot reproduce the failure scenarios (e.g. network deadlocks) observed in
field data from large-scale production systems. While there may be slight
optimizations still available in the injector code (e.g. a queue based logging
system), the recovery window and the inherent delay of the SMW’s logging
leave little room for improvement. Any optimization in the injector would
likely be negligible. There is simply not enough time for faults to propagate
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throughout the system and create adverse effects on JYC.
5.4 Future Work
The future of this work has many branches, including further development
of HPCArrow to support a variety of software and systems beyond Cray,
deeper investigation of hung applications and real-time detection of such
phenomenon, more fault models such as memory and network congestion,
and more experiments on multiple faults scenarios.
Future work has already begun towards resiliency comparisons between
Gemini and Aries interconnects. HPCArrow currently can support fault in-
jections on Aries interconnects and Cray XC machines. This development
occurred using SNL’s Cray XC testbeds, Voltrino and Mutrino, and fault
injection experiments are currently underway. Aries and Gemini are not
exactly one-to-one mappings due to architectural differences. For example,
there are four types of links on Aries (green, blue, black, and tweak) as op-
posed to the general link on Gemini. Despite this, the fault models remain
generally the same. The same LDMS traffic data and system logs can still be
collected since these are still Cray systems. However, again, due to architec-
tural differences in the network fabric, analysis code will need to be altered
and tailored to the components that LDMS is measuring. Ultimately, the
fault injection approach remains the same and we can retain the automation,
control, and reproducible advantages that HPCArrow provides. Expanding
to other systems beyond Cray may be possible as long as topology mappings
are provided per system and there are software mechanisms to induce fail-
ures, recover, measure traffic, and monitor system behaviors and responses to
failures. Since HPCArrow is built using Python, it may be as easy as includ-
ing more system-specific commands. Separate programs or scripts written to
trigger faults can also be incorporated into HPCArrow. Applications are a
major overhead in porting HPCArrow to other systems as benchmarks will
need to be recompiled and reconfigured for each system and their software.
Since this work could not cause failed failovers and reproduce critical sys-
tem errors, future work in the space of injections during recovery should
involve testing and running these experiments on larger scale systems. Our
hypothesis is that since small-scale HPC systems have such short windows of
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recovery, there is not enough time for failures and their effects to propagate
throughout the system. Large-scale systems such as Blue Waters have much
longer windows of recovery time. A related hypothesis is that there may be
a window of vulnerability in the failover procedure that is either nonexistent
or very short in duration on small-scale systems, but much longer on large-
scale systems. One way to test these hypotheses on a small-scale system
like JYC would be to investigate methods to create artificial delays during
the recovery stages. Another avenue of investigation is to determine whether
such a window of vulnerability exists by examining data generated by large-
scale systems and then to quantify a relationship between this window of
vulnerability and the system scale.
5.5 Conclusion
In this work, we developed a software-implemented fault injection tool called
HPCArrow as well as a fault injection methodology that can be used to
assess fault tolerance and resiliency of HPC systems. We demonstrated HP-
CArrow’s capabilities through four fault injection campaigns, covering single
injections, time-varying or delayed injections, and injections during recovery.
These injections induce failures on network and compute components. This
fault injection tool and methodology can be expanded to other systems. It
has currently been extended to Cray XC systems and Aries interconnects.
In addition to demonstrating HPCArrow, these campaigns also provided in-
sights into application-level resiliency and system-level resiliency. There are
notable deficiencies in fault tolerance across various HPC application frame-
works, most severely for Charm++ applications. Our experiments revealed
a failure phenomenon of application hangs in which forward progress is not
made, but jobs are not terminated until the maximum allowed time has
elapsed. At the system level, failover procedures are very robust and able to
handle both single and multiple faults in the network, having an arsenal of
responses to these various scenarios.
108
REFERENCES
[1] M. Snir, R. W. Wisniewski, J. A. Abraham, S. V. Adve, S. Bagchi,
P. Balaji, J. Belak, P. Bose, F. Cappello, B. Carlson, A. A. Chien,
P. Coteus, N. A. Debardeleben, P. C. Diniz, C. Engelmann, M. Erez,
S. Fazzari, A. Geist, R. Gupta, F. Johnson, S. Krishnamoorthy,
S. Leyffer, D. Liberty, S. Mitra, T. Munson, R. Schreiber, J. Stearley,
and E. V. Hensbergen, “Addressing failures in exascale computing,”
Int. J. High Perform. Comput. Appl., vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 129–173, May
2014. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1094342014522573
[2] M.-C. Hsueh, T. K. Tsai, and R. K. Iyer, “Fault injection techniques
and tools,” Computer, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 75–82, April 1997.
[3] C. D. Martino, W. Kramer, Z. Kalbarczyk, and R. Iyer, “Measuring
and understanding extreme-scale application resilience: A field study
of 5,000,000 HPC application runs,” in 2015 45th Annual IEEE/IFIP
International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, June
2015, pp. 25–36.
[4] C. D. Martino, Z. Kalbarczyk, R. K. Iyer, F. Baccanico, J. Fullop,
and W. Kramer, “Lessons learned from the analysis of system
failures at petascale: The case of Blue Waters,” in Proceedings
of the 2014 44th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on
Dependable Systems and Networks, ser. DSN ’14. Washington,
DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2014. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2014.62 pp. 610–621.
[5] S. Jha, V. Formicola, C. D. Martino, M. Dalton, W. T. Kramer,
Z. Kalbarczyk, and R. K. Iyer, “Resiliency of HPC interconnects: A
case study of interconnect failures and recovery in Blue Waters,” IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, pp. 1–1, 2017.
[6] S. Jha, V. Formicola, Z. Kalbarczyk, C. D. Martino, W. T. Kramer,
and R. K. Iyer, “Analysis of Gemini interconnect recovery mechanisms:
Methods and observations,” Cray User Group, pp. 8–12, 2016.
109
[7] M. Kumar, S. Gupta, T. Patel, M. Wilder, W. Shi, S. Fu, C. Engelmann,
and D. Tiwari, “Understanding and analyzing interconnect errors and
network congestion on a large scale HPC system,” in 2018 48th An-
nual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and
Networks (DSN), June 2018, pp. 107–114.
[8] M. A. Ezell, “Understanding the impact of interconnect failures
on system operation,” Jan 2013. [Online]. Available: https:
//cug.org/proceedings/cug2013 proceedings/includes/files/pap140.pdf
[9] K. Chadalavada and R. Sisneros, “Analysis of the Blue Waters file sys-
tem architecture for application I/O performance,” Cray User Group,
Jan 2013.
[10] C.-K. Chang, S. Lym, N. Kelly, M. B. Sullivan, and M. Erez,
“Evaluating and accelerating high-fidelity error injection for HPC,”
in Proceedings of the International Conference for High Performance
Computing, Networking, Storage, and Analysis, ser. SC ’18.
Piscataway, NJ, USA: IEEE Press, 2018. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3291656.3291716 pp. 45:1–45:13.
[11] J. Calhoun, L. N. Olson, and M. Snir, “FlipIt: An LLVM based fault
injector for HPC,” in Euro-Par Workshops, 2014.
[12] Q. Guan, N. Debardeleben, S. Blanchard, and S. Fu, “F-SEFI: A fine-
grained soft error fault injection tool for profiling application vulnera-
bility,” in 2014 IEEE 28th International Parallel and Distributed Pro-
cessing Symposium, May 2014, pp. 1245–1254.
[13] O. Tuncer, E. Ates, Y. Zhang, A. Turk, J. M. Brandt, V. J. Leung,
M. Egele, and A. K. Coskun, “Diagnosing performance variations in
HPC applications using machine learning,” in ISC, 2017.
[14] A. Netti, Z. Kiziltan, O. Babaoglu, A. Srbu, A. Bartolini, and A. Borgh-
esi, “FINJ: A fault injection tool for HPC systems,” 08 2018.
[15] V. Formicola, S. Jha, D. Chen, F. Deng, A. Bonnie, M. Mason,
J. Brandt, A. Gentile, L. Kaplan, J. Repik, J. Enos, M. Showerman,
A. Greiner, Z. Kalbarczyk, R. Iyer, and W. Kramer, “Understand-
ing fault scenarios and impacts through fault injection experiments in
Cielo,” in Cray User Group, May 2017.
[16] “Blue Waters user portal — system summary.” [Online]. Available:
https://bluewaters.ncsa.illinois.edu/hardware-summary
[17] R. Alverson, D. Roweth, and L. Kaplan, “The Gemini system intercon-
nect,” in 2010 18th IEEE Symposium on High Performance Intercon-
nects, Aug 2010, pp. 83–87.
110
[18] Managing System Software for Cray XE and Cray XT Systems,
S239331 ed., Cray, Inc, 2010.
[19] “Blue Waters user portal — running your jobs.” [Online]. Available:
https://bluewaters.ncsa.illinois.edu/running-your-jobs
[20] “TORQUE resource manager.” [Online]. Available: http://www.
adaptivecomputing.com/products/torque/
[21] “Moab cloud HPC suite.” [Online]. Available: http://www.
adaptivecomputing.com/moab-hpc-basic-edition/
[22] M. Karo, R. Lagerstrom, M. Kohnke, and C. Albing, “The application
level placement scheduler,” Cray User Group, May 2006.
[23] Network Resiliency for Cray XE and Cray XK Systems, S0032d ed.,
Cray, Inc, 2014.
[24] B. Alverson, E. Froese, L. Kaplan, and D. Roweth, “Cray
XC series network,” Tech. Rep. White Paper WP-Aries01-1112,
2012. [Online]. Available: https://www.cray.com/sites/default/files/
resources/CrayXCNetwork.pdf
[25] “Blue Waters user portal — benchmarks.” [Online]. Available:
https://bluewaters.ncsa.illinois.edu/benchmarks
[26] L. V. Kale and S. Krishnan, “Charm++: A portable concurrent object
oriented system based on C++,” SIGPLAN Not., vol. 28, no. 10,
pp. 91–108, Oct 1993. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/
167962.165874
[27] Y. Sun, G. Zheng, L. V. Kal, T. R. Jones, and R. Olson, “A uGNI-based
asynchronous message-driven runtime system for cray supercomputers
with Gemini interconnect,” in 2012 IEEE 26th International Parallel
and Distributed Processing Symposium, May 2012, pp. 751–762.
[28] “Charm++: Parallel programming framework.” [Online]. Available:
http://charm.cs.illinois.edu/manuals/html/charm++/21.html
[29] “Parallel views: Newsletter of the parallel programming laboratory.”
[Online]. Available: http://charm.cs.uiuc.edu/docs/PPLnewsletter
fall2012-forweb.pdf
[30] W. Gropp, E. Lusk, N. Doss, and A. Skjellum, “A high-performance,
portable implementation of the mpi message passing interface
standard,” Parallel Comput., vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 789–828, Sept 1996.
[Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-8191(96)00024-5
111
[31] W. Gropp and E. Lusk, “Fault tolerance in message passing interface
programs,” The International Journal of High Performance Computing
Applications, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 363–372, 2004. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1177/1094342004046045
[32] G. Almasi, PGAS (Partitioned Global Address Space) Languages.
Boston, MA: Springer US, 2011, pp. 1539–1545.




[34] C. D. Martino, S. Jha, W. Kramer, Z. Kalbarczyk, and R. K. Iyer,
“LogDiver: A tool for measuring resilience of extreme-scale systems and
applications,” in Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Fault Tolerance
for HPC at eXtreme Scale, ser. FTXS ’15. New York, NY, USA: ACM,
2015. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2751504.2751511
pp. 11–18.
[35] A. Agelastos, B. Allan, J. Brandt, P. Cassella, J. Enos, J. Fullop,
A. Gentile, S. Monk, N. Naksinehaboon, J. Ogden, M. Rajan,
M. Showerman, J. Stevenson, N. Taerat, and T. Tucker, “The
lightweight distributed metric service: A scalable infrastructure
for continuous monitoring of large scale computing systems and
applications,” in Proceedings of the International Conference for High
Performance Computing, Networking, Storage and Analysis, ser. SC
’14. Piscataway, NJ, USA: IEEE Press, 2014. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1109/SC.2014.18 pp. 154–165.
[36] L. R. Devnani, “Fault injections on mission critical systems,” M.S. the-
sis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2018.
[37] “Blue Waters user portal — FAQ.” [Online]. Available: https:
//bluewaters.ncsa.illinois.edu/faq
[38] XC Series GNI and DMAPP API User Guide, S-2446 ed., Cray, Inc,
2017.





Table A.1: JYC component names for each component type. * means this
is our naming convention for identifying connections in this work as there is




Cabinet c0-0 Cabinet 0 (row 0-column 0)
Chassis c0-0c2 Chassis 2 in Cabinet 0
Blade c0-0c0s5 Blade 5 in Chassis 0 of Cabinet 0
Node c0-0c1s3n3 Node 3 on Blade 3 in Chassis 1 of Cabinet 0
Gemini c0-0c2s1g0 Gemini 0 on Blade 1 in Chassis 2 of Cabinet
0
Link c0-0c2s1g1l16 Link 16 (row 1, col 6 in tile array) on Gemini
1 on Blade 1 in Chassis 2 of Cabinet 0
*Connection c0-0c2s1g1,Z- Z- Connection (two torus connections) on





The following tables detail the commands executed by HPCArrow’s Injection
Manager on the SMW. Note that the restoration commands in Table B.2
must be run as the crayadm user on the SMW.
Table B.1: Cray fault injection commands executed by HPCArrow.
Fault Type Command Additional Information
Link
Connection
xtmemio -w ::{gemini} {0x0006000128 |
(link row << 22) | (link col << 19)} 2
0
{gemini}: Target Gemini’s cname.
{link row} and {link col}: Row and column (from
tile array) of target link For example, a target
link "c0-0c1s0g1l27" parameters are:
{gemini} = "c0-0c1s0g1"
{link row} = 2
{link col} = 7
For connections, the command is repeated for each
link in the target connection direction. This
would be repeated 4x for Y+/Y- connections or 8x
for Z+/Z- connections.
Node xtnmi {node} {node}: Target node cname.
For example, {node} = "c0-0c2s0n3"
Note: Must run as crayadm
Blade rsh -l root {blade} "/opt/bin/i2c
2:0x60/2=0x02,0x00"
{blade}: Target blade cname.
For example, {blade} = "c0-0c2s0"
Table B.2: Cray warm swap restoration commands executed by HPCArrow.
Fault Type Command Additional Information
Link xtwarmswap -s {link}, {link end} -p p0 {link}: Target link cname
{link end}: Target link’s other end cname
Connection xtwarmswap -s {links} -p p0 {links}: Comma separated list of links to
restore from target connection. The other ends
of target connection must also be specified.
Node xtbootsys --reboot -L CNL0 {node} {node}: Target node cname.
Note: Requires an interactive terminal session
on the SMW.
Blade Remove: xtwarmswap --force --remove
{blade}
Add: xtwarmswap --add {blade}
Boot: xtcli boot CNL0 {blade}
{blade}: Target blade cname. Remove, add, and




Due to restricted access to the SMW, we extended HPCArrow’s function-
ality to allow us to remotely trigger injections as normal JYC users. To
achieve this, we remotely communicate with HPCArrow’s Injection Manager
via the job names of applications that we submit to the job scheduler. All
applications of a run are specified with the same trailing string in the job
name.
Figure C.1 provides an example job name submitted to JYC and broken
down into its parts. The parts are explained below. Note that * means it
is required, otherwise the injection does not execute. For more than two
injections, this method is not scalable due to limitations on the length of job
names.
Figure C.1: Breakdown of the parts of an example job name submitted to
the ALPS.
App Name*
The name of the application. This is pre-populated by the Workload
Generator.
# Nodes*
The number of nodes the application is running on. This is pre-
populated by the Workload Generator.
Configuration Name*
The name of the configuration set of applications that was submitted
together. This is pre-populated by the Workload Generator.
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Injection Type*
Tells the injector to perform single or multiple injection(s). User-
specified. If not specified, the injection cancels.
First Fault Type*
Tells the injector what type of component to initially fail. User-specified.
If not specified, the injection cancels.
First Fault Cname*
Provides the first fault’s cname, which defines the component’s phys-
ical location in the system. User-specified. If not specified, a random
component of the specified fault type is selected.
Second Fault Type
Tells the injector what type of component to fail second if performing
multiple injections.
Second Fault Cname
Provides the second fault’s cname.
Recovery Stage
Tells the injector to fail the second component during recovery. If not
specified and a second fault is still specified, the injector will inject the
fault after recovery. Note “stage” must be specified to indicate fault
during recovery.
Injection Delay
Tells the injector to fail the first fault after some delay time (in seconds)
from the start of the experiment. This delay only applies to the second




In this work, nine unique applications are compiled and configured to run
as workloads on JYC. Campaign I uses a subset of these nine, Application
Set I: AWP-ODC, AMR (SMP, HugePages), Kripke (HugePages), LeanMD
(HugePages), and UPC-FT. Campaigns II to IV use a different subset, Appli-
cation Set II: AMR (HugePages), Kripke (HugePages), LeanMD (HugePages),
MILC, NAMD (SMP), and PSDNS. For each set, applications are selected,
scaled, and placed on the JYC system map. This is a configuration. Cam-
paign I uses five configurations drawn from Set I: Configuration 1 to 5.
Campaigns II to IV draw from Set II to create three configurations: Dense,
Medium, and Sparse Configurations.
Application Name
The name of the benchmark. Charm++ applications are distinguished
between symmetric multiprocessing (SMP) and HugePages.
Application Size
The number of nodes that the application is running on.
Node Type
The node type the application is using: XE, XK, or both.
Processes Per Node (PPN)
Cray XE nodes support 32 processes; XK nodes support 16. If an
application runs on a combination of XE and XK nodes, then the PPN
is limited by the node with the smallest number of processes.
Node IDs
The name identifiers of nodes on which the application runs.
Application Specific Parameters
Benchmark-specific parameters to adjust for scaling and run time.
117
Table D.1: Application Set I, Configuration 1 parameters.
App Name App Size Node Type PPN Node IDs Parameters
AWP-ODC 32 XE 16 32-63 NX = NY = NX = 712
NPX = NPY = NPZ = 8
Kripke
(HugePages)
8 XK 16 66-69,90-93 NITER = 13
LeanMD
(HugePages)
8 XK 16 72-75,84-87 steps = 1900
UPC-FT 4 XE 32 72-75,84-87 steps = 1900
NX = 4
NY = 32
Figure D.1: Application Set I, Configuration 1 JYC system mapping.
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Table D.2: Application Set I, Configuration 2 parameters.
App Name App Size Node Type PPN Node IDs Parameters
AMR
(HugePages)
4 XE 32 2,3,28,29 ITERATIONS = 175
AMR (SMP) 32 XE 32 32-63 ITERATIONS = 800
AWP-ODC 2 XE 32 32-63 NX = NY = NX = 368
NPX = NPY = NPZ = 4
Kripke
(HugePages)
4 XE 32 6,7,24,25 NITER = 13
LeanMD
(HugePages)
2 XE 32 11,20 steps = 950
LeanMD
(HugePages)
4 XE 32 12,13,18,19 steps = 1775
UPC-FT 32 XE/XK 16 64-95 steps = 76000
NX = 32
NY = 16
Figure D.2: Application Set I, Configuration 2 JYC system mapping.
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Table D.3: Application Set I, Configuration 3 parameters.
App Name App Size Node Type PPN Node IDs Parameters
AMR
(HugePages)
2 XE 32 60,61 ITERATIONS = 95
AWP-ODC 4 XK 16 74,75,84,85 NX = NY = NX = 364
NPX = NPY = NPZ = 4
LeanMD
(HugePages)
4 XE 32 6,7,24,25 steps = 1775
UPC-FT 2 XE 32 16,17 steps = 12500
NX = 2
NY = 32
Figure D.3: Application Set I, Configuration 3 JYC system mapping.
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Table D.4: Application Set I, Configuration 4 parameters.
App Name App Size Node Type PPN Node IDs Parameters
AMR
(HugePages)
2 XE 32 16,17 ITERATIONS = 95
AWP-ODC 32 XE/XK 16 64-95 NX = NY = NX = 712
NPX = NPY = NPZ = 8
Kripke
(HugePages)
2 XE 32 2,3 NITER = 13
UPC-FT 8 XE 32 34-37,58-61 steps = 32000
NX = 8
NY = 32
Figure D.4: Application Set I, Configuration 4 JYC system mapping.
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Table D.5: Application Set I, Configuration 5 parameters.
App Name App Size Node Type PPN Node IDs Parameters
AMR (SMP) 64 XE/XK 16 32-95 ITERATIONS = 800
AWP-ODC 2 XE 32 18,19 NX = NY = NX = 368
NPX = NPY = NPZ = 4
UPC-FT 4 XE 32 6,7,24,25 steps = 21500
NX = 4
NY = 32
Figure D.5: Application Set I, Configuration 5 JYC system mapping.
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Table D.6: Application Set II, Dense Configuration parameters.
App Name App Size Node Type PPN Node IDs Parameters
AMR
(HugePages)
2 XE 32 20,21 ITERATIONS = 95
Kripke
(HugePages)
4 XE 32 6,7,24,25 NITER = 14
LeanMD
(HugePages)
16 XE 32 40-55 steps = 7000
MILC 2 XE 32 16,17 NX = NY = NZ = NT = 16
Trajectories = 2
MILC 16 XE 32 32-39,56-63 NX = NY = NZ = NT = 32
Trajectories = 1
NAMD (SMP) 4 XE 32 6,7,24,25 numsteps = 10700
PSDNS 4 XE 32 12,13,18,19 dims: 4 32
nsteps = 46
PSDNS 32 XE/XK 32 64-95 dims:16 64
nsteps = 320
Figure D.6: Application Set II, Dense Configuration JYC system mapping.
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Table D.7: Application Set II, Medium Configuration parameters.
App Name App Size Node Type PPN Node IDs Parameters
AMR
(HugePages)
4 XE 32 12,13,18,19 ITERATIONS = 175
Kripke
(HugePages)
8 XK 16 72-75,84-87 NITER = 13
LeanMD
(HugePages)
8 XK 16 64-67,92-95 steps = 1900
MILC 4 XE 32 2,3,28,29 NX = NY = NZ = NT = 16
Trajectories = 4
NAMD (SMP) 16 XE 32 32-39,56-63 numsteps = 40500
PSDNS 8 XE 32 44-51 dims: 8 32
nsteps = 100
Figure D.7: Application Set II, Medium Configuration JYC system
mapping.
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Table D.8: Application Set II, Sparse Configuration parameters.
App Name App Size Node Type PPN Node IDs Parameters
AMR
(HugePages)
4 XK 16 64,65,94,95 ITERATIONS = 175
Kripke
(HugePages)
8 XK 16 70,71,88,89 NITER = 14
LeanMD
(HugePages)
2 XE 32 48,49 steps = 950
MILC 4 XE 32 78-81 NX = NY = NZ = NT = 16
Trajectories = 4
NAMD (SMP) 4 XE 32 36,37,58,59 numsteps = 10700
PSDNS 4 XE 32 42,43,52,53 dims: 4 32
nsteps = 46




The following tables list the components that were targeted during Cam-
paigns II to IV based on LDMS traffic data. For each configuration in Appli-
cation Set II, every application is examined. For each application, the Gemini
and corresponding torus connection direction with the highest throughput is
selected as the base target component for a connection fault. The link, node,
and blade faults simply follow from selection of the target Gemini and con-
nection. Note that for NAMD in the Medium Configuration and MILC in
the Dense Configuration, there is a second row. These are the targets for
injections during recovery, based on the Gemini targeted in the first fault
and the traffic data on that same Gemini.
Table E.1: Target components of the Dense Configuration for each fault
type, selected based on the highest throughput connection direction for
application runs without any injections.
App Name Connection Links Blade














Table E.2: Target components of the Medium Configuration for each fault
type, selected based on the highest throughput connection direction for
application runs without any injections.
App Name Connection Link(s) Blade


















Table E.3: Target components of the Sparse Configuration for each fault
type, selected based on the highest throughput connection direction for
application runs without any injections.
App Name Connection Links Blade


























CAMPAIGN I FULL SUMMARY
Table F.1: Full summary of Campaign I, showing the outcomes of
applications in the presence of (direct and indirect) faults.
Benchmark Application Fault Type
Run Status #(%)




Blade 2 (22.22) 0 7 (77.78)
Connection 0 0 9 (100.00)
Link 0 0 9 (100.00)
No Injection 0 0 9 (100.00)
Kripke
Blade 1 (10.00) 0 9 (90.00)
Connection 0 1 (10.00) 9 (90.00)
Link 0 2 (20.00) 8 (80.00)
No Injection 0 0 9 (100.00)
LeanMD
Blade 3 (23.08) 0 10 (76.92)
Connection 2 (15.38) 0 11 (84.62)
Link 0 1 (7.69) 12 (92.31)




Blade 5 (83.33) 0 1 (16.67)
Connection 5 (83.33) 0 1 (16.67)
Link 4 (66.67) 0 2 (33.33)
No Injection 0 0 6 (100.00)
MPI AWP-ODC
Blade 3 (18.75) 0 13 (81.25)
Connection 0 0 16 (100.00)
Link 0 0 16 (100.00)
No Injection 0 0 15 (100.00)
PGAS UPC-FT
Blade 2 (12.50) 0 14 (87.50)
Connection 2 (12.50) 0 14 (87.50)
Link 3 (18.75) 0 13 (81.25)
No Injection 0 0 15 (100.00)
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APPENDIX G
CAMPAIGN II FULL SUMMARY
Table G.1: Full summary of Campaign II, showing the outcomes of
applications in the presence of (direct and indirect) faults.
Benchmark Application Fault Type
Run Status #(%)




Blade 5 (15.62) 0 27 (84.38)
Connection 6 (15.79) 4 (10.53) 28 (73.68)
Link 3 (5.77) 1 (1.92) 48 (92.31)
No Injection 0 0 30 (100.0)
Kripke
Blade 5 (13.51) 0 32 (86.49)
Connection 5 (13.16) 1 (2.63) 32 (84.21)
Link 0 2 (3.85) 50 (96.15)
No Injection 0 0 30 (100.0)
LeanMD
Blade 5 (13.51) 0 32 (86.49)
Connection 3 (7.89) 2 (5.26) 33 (86.84)
Link 0 5 (9.62) 47 (90.38)




Blade 5 (13.51) 0 32 (86.49)
Connection 1 (2.63) 4 (10.53) 33 (86.84)
Link 1 (1.92) 10 (19.23) 41 (78.85)
No Injection 0 0 30 (100.0)
MPI
MILC
Blade 5 (9.26) 0 49 (90.74)
Connection 0 0 55 (100.0)
Link 4 (6.45) 0 58 (93.55)
No Injection 0 0 40 (100.0)
PSDNS
Blade 13 (22.03) 0 46 (77.97)
Connection 0 0 55 (100.0)
Link 5 (7.58) 0 61 (92.42)





Table H.1: Summary statistics for the Nlrd Log Delay, Time to Detection
(link vs. connection), Time to Injection (link vs. connection), Recovery
Durations (single fault vs. multiple faults) reported in Campaign IV. All
numbers are reported in seconds except for Count.
Distribution Name Injection or
Fault Type
Count Mean Std Min 25% 50% 75% Max
Nlrd Log Delay - 7072 1.004627 0.400815 0.046389 0.730470 1.000891 1.285352 1.987961
Time to Detection Blade 11 0.297091 0.084562 0.227000 0.244000 0.255000 0.318000 0.502000
Connection 28 1.429964 0.584833 0.252000 1.043750 1.436500 1.795000 2.771000
Link 28 1.405214 0.699859 0.224000 0.823500 1.310000 1.869250 2.793000
Time to Injection Blade 11 0.297091 0.084562 0.227000 0.244000 0.255000 0.318000 0.502000
Connection 28 1.425679 0.761596 0.475000 0.647750 1.387500 2.139250 2.975000
Link 28 0.336893 0.459619 0.116000 0.129250 0.141000 0.212500 1.849000
Recovery Durations Single 127 39.883707 2.648896 35.040480 38.029916 39.044034 41.035962 51.047644
Multiple 56 66.665411 15.441623 35.027203 55.065860 76.079558 78.078578 84.081822
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